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TITLE: CONTENT VARIATION IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR FATAL POLICE USE OF 
FORCE TRIALS DO NOT MODERATE THE EFFECT OF ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICE 
ON VERDICTS 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Eric Jacobs 
When police officers are charged with illegal use of force, jurors’ pre-existing attitudes 
toward the police can shape how jurors interpret trial evidence: Was the officer just doing his job 
under high amounts of pressure while fearing for his life? Or did the officer abuse his power with 
disregard for the victim’s life? The language in jury instructions, however, might reduce or 
exacerbate the effect of jurors’ attitudes toward police on their verdict decisions. In an 
experimental mock-jury study, the content of jury instructions was manipulated to be consistent 
with an objective standard of reasonableness (i.e., Tennessee v. Garner, 1985) or a subjective 
standard of reasonableness (Graham v. Connor, 1989), along with a control condition with no 
police-specific language. I predicted that, compared to control instructions, objective standards 
would weaken, and subjective standards would strengthen, the influence of attitudes on verdicts. 
Attitudes toward police were measured as a continuous predictor and were counterbalanced 
before and after the trial. An online sample of individual mock-jurors (N = 539) viewed a trial 
presentation in which a police officer was charged with first-degree murder for illegal use of 
force. The importance of prosecution evidence and the extent to which they took the officer’s 
perspective were potential mediators of the relationship between attitudes and verdicts. As 
predicted, jurors’ negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted the importance of 
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking. In turn, the importance of prosecution evidence 
ii 
 
and perspective-taking predicted juror’s perceptions of officer guilt. Instruction content was not a 
successful moderator of the relationship between attitudes and verdicts. The effect of attitudes on 
verdicts in fatal police use of force trials has important implications for the psychological study 
of jury decision-making, and for the criminal justice system as a whole.  
Key Words: fatal police use of force; attitudes; attitudes toward police; juror verdict 
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In recent years, public trust in the police has continually decreased as high-profile police 
killings of unarmed Black men came to the forefront of public discourse and media coverage 
(McLaughlin, 2015; Park, 2018). Many community members believe the legal system does not 
hold police officers accountable, as prosecutors rarely bring charges against police officers in 
fatal use of force cases (Stinson, 2019). However, when police officers are brought to trial for 
unjustified use of fatal force and the issue is put back in the hands of the public (i.e., jurors), 
outcomes do not reflect a clear bias in favor of police officers. Archival analysis of actual jury 
trials of police officers criminally charged for fatal on-duty shootings since 2005 showed 
verdicts to be nearly evenly split down the middle (Ratliff, Peter-Hagene, Davis, & Rajayah, 
unpublished manuscript). Given the divided nature of public reactions, it is important to learn 
how important jurors’ attitudes toward the police are to their verdict decisions, regardless of case 
facts. Jurors in fatal use of force trials might be susceptible to the influence of their own pre-
existing attitudes about police. Can the potential influence of jurors’ attitudes be minimized or 
exacerbated by the legal instructions jurors are given when determining their verdicts? 
Furthermore, do specific types of jury instructions influence the relationship between jurors’ pre-
existing attitudes toward police and verdicts by distorting their interpretation of the evidence, or 
by encouraging them to consider the events from the officer’s perspective?  
Although the strength of the evidence is generally the best predictor of verdicts in most 
trials (Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & Stolle, 2009), jurors’ attitudes toward police 
(i.e., their general trust or distrust of police) might influence verdicts in fatal use of force trials. 
According to the story model of jury decision making, jurors naturally organize evidence in 
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terms of a cause and effect narrative, filling in any ambiguous gaps on their own (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1981; 1988; 1993). For example, Carlson & Russo (2001) found that jurors in a mock 
civil negligence trial selectively attended to and evaluated new information according to their 
pre-trial attitudes toward “typical” plaintiffs and defendants in such cases. Jurors who had 
positive (versus negative) attitudes toward typical civil defendants distorted the evidence in favor 
of the defense, while jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward plaintiffs distorted 
evidence in favor of the prosecution. Because pre-existing beliefs tend to provide the narrative 
framework for how jurors interpret evidence and instructions (Pennington & Hastie, 1981; 
Ellsworth, 1993), jurors’ pre-trial attitudes toward police might similarly influence judgments 
and decision-making in fatal police use of force trials.  
Language and phrasing variations in jury instructions might influence verdicts directly, or 
by reducing or enhancing the effect of pre-trial attitudes. Two Supreme Court rulings 
recommend very different types of instructions, yet neither of them has been tested empirically 
to assess their effects, if any, on verdicts. In Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor 
(1989), the Supreme Court defined the “reasonableness standard” by which the behavior of 
police officers charged with excessive or fatal use of force should be judged. The 1985 Garner 
decision provided a specific list of factors to consider in determining whether the totality of 
circumstances justified a particular use of force (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent 
persons from officer behavior, presence/absence of deadly weapon, whether warning was given, 
etc.). Four years later, the 1989 Graham ruling brought into focus the superseding moment, or the 
very narrow point in time during which an officer decides to use deadly force (e.g., “…police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving...”). Thus, the Justice System is compelled to comply with 
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Supreme Court precedent, and as such, must incorporate the language provided in Connor and 
Graham into jury instructions in fatal use of force trials. However, jury instructions in actual 
police use of force trials are ultimately left to the discretion of presiding judges and, as a result, 
incorporation of the language from Connor and Graham has varied drastically across 
jurisdictions.   
A review of jury pattern instructions—available online from all US Appellate Courts, 
except the Second and Fourth Circuits—uncovered substantial inconsistencies in how the 
guidelines for evaluating excessive and fatal police use of force have been explained to jurors. 
Specifically, some pattern instructions incorporated language from Graham, others incorporated 
language from Garner, and others contained a combination of language from both. These 
inconsistencies have significant implications for the uniform and unbiased administration of 
justice because the language in these instructions might have psychological implications for how 
jurors process evidence in cases involving police officers as defendants. Importantly, research 
illustrates that jury instructions might increase the predictive power of attitudes for verdicts in 
some situations (Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017) and decrease the predictive power in other 
situations (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991). Although it is not easy to change people’s attitudes about 
police, it is possible to influence the mindset (i.e., a way of thinking about or approaching a task) 
with which jurors approach evaluating evidence (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2008). Furthermore, 
instructing or encouraging participants to think in specific ways can affect behavioral outcomes 
(Yeager & Dweck, 2012). 
Jury instructions adapted from the Graham ruling (i.e., superseding moment) guide jurors 
to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness in their decision-making process. Subjective 
reasonableness standards lead to greater reliance on existing attitudes and shallow information 
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processing (Epstein, 1994), which might lead jurors to focus on attitude-congruent evidence (i.e., 
defense evidence for pro-police jurors and prosecution evidence for anti-police jurors). 
Importantly, instructing jurors to adopt subjective (versus objective) standards of reasonableness 
leads to fewer guilty verdicts (Terrance, Matheson, & Spanos, 2000). Additionally, superseding 
moment instructions (Graham, 1989) guide jurors to view the shooting event from the officer’s 
perspective. Given that jurors who engage in such perspective-taking are more likely to express 
empathy for defendants and less likely to find them guilty (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; 
Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014), this type of instruction might shift 
verdicts in favor of police officers. Moreover, it is also possible that Graham-based instructions 
could influence verdicts by focusing juror’s attention on the very narrow moment in which force 
was used rather than the entirety of circumstance. 
 In contrast to superseding moment instructions, instructions adapted from the 1985 
Garner decision (i.e., totality of circumstance) advise jurors to consider several relatively 
objective factors when determining whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable. The list of 
specific factors in totality of circumstance instructions might induce an objective mindset, and 
thus, prompt jurors to engage in a more deliberate and unbiased evaluation of the evidence. 
Furthermore, unlike the split-second focus of the superseding moment instructions, totality of 
circumstance instructions guide jurors to consider the entire chain of events before, during, and 
after the shooting incident. Hence, the goal of the present research was to empirically test 
whether common language variations in jury instruction content resulted in disparate verdict 
outcomes across conditions in which jurors with positive or negative attitudes toward police 






The Influence of Attitudes on Jurors’ Decision Making 
Attitudes and jurors’ judgments. To understand jurors’ judgments in fatal use of force 
cases, it is first necessary to consider the influence of jurors’ pre-existing attitudes on the way 
they make judgments and decisions. Juror’s decisions are generally consistent with that of judges 
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Eisenberg et al., 2005) and their verdicts are generally best predicted by 
the strength of the evidence. However, jurors do not come into the courtroom as blank slates, 
free of any preconceived notions about various types of “good” or “bad” people that inhabit the 
social world around them. Rather, people’s cumulative history of positive or negative 
experiences with various social groups are likely to shape their attitudes. For example, people’s 
prior experience with police and the justice system are likely to shape their attitudes toward 
police (Rosenbaum, et al., 2005).  
Attitudes can affect behavior like decision-making spontaneously, or the process can be 
more deliberative. According to Fazio (2007) the process occurs through an automatic sequence 
in which attitudes are activated by situational factors and then come to promote selective 
processing of attitude-congruent information. Hence, a person’s attitude about any given social 
object is likely to shape how they process new information related to that object, and to prepare 
people to perceive events that are consistent with their beliefs (Roskos-Ewoldwon & Fazio, 
1992; Fazio, Roskos-Ewoldwon, & Owell, 1994). When a person encounters the attitude object, 
the attitude becomes activated to a level of accessibility that increases the likelihood that the 
attitude will affect how subsequent information is interpreted. For example, when people 
encounter a police officer defendant, their general attitudes toward police are likely to become 
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more readily accessible in memory.  
Furthermore, when attitudes are based on direct personal experience, they are more easily 
accessible, and thus, more likely to influence behavior (Regan & Fazio, 1977). Therefore, when 
people have highly accessible attitudes toward a social object or category (e.g., police officers), 
the object is more likely to attract their attention and to provide the framework for how they 
perceive and process new information related to that object (e.g., police officer-hero versus 
police officer-villain). Alternatively, attitudes can influence behavior through a more deliberate 
process. For example, reasoned action approaches (Ajzen, 1991, 2012; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) 
suggest that attitudes toward a given behavior, perceived social norms, and perceived behavioral 
control all contribute to the development of a person’s intentions. In turn, a person’s intentions 
are predictive of their behavior. Attitudes are more likely to influence behavior when individuals 
have stable (Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000) and well-rehearsed (Erber, Hodges, & Wilson, 
1995; Wyer & Srull, 1989) attitudes.  
Prior evidence suggests that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward police might have a 
substantial influence on the way jurors perceive and interpret evidence and jury instructions 
during trials with police officer defendants (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Ellsworth, 1993; Pennington 
& Hastie, 1981; 1988; 1993). For instance, Carlson & Russo (2001) found that mock jurors in a 
civil negligence trial selectively attended to and evaluated new information according to their 
pre-trial attitudes. More specifically, jurors who had positive (versus negative) attitudes toward 
“typical” civil defendants distorted the evidence in favor of the defense. In contrast, jurors with 
positive (versus negative) attitudes toward prosecutors distorted the evidence in favor of the 
prosecution. Therefore, in a complex trial, where both sides offer evidence to support their 
claims and where the “correct” verdict is not immediately obvious, jurors with positive attitudes 
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toward police might be likely to focus on evidence from the defense and jurors with negative 
attitudes toward police might be likely to focus on evidence from the prosecution.  
Attitudes toward police. In general, people have at least somewhat positive views of the 
police. Specifically, the Pew Research Center (Fingerhut, 2017) found that two-thirds of the 
public (64%) rated officers warmly, 16% gave a neutral rating, and just 18% gave a cold rating. 
Gallup polls have similarly demonstrated that Americans rank the police as the third highest 
institution in which they have confidence, with a majority (54%) reporting a “great deal” of 
confidence in police, 31% endorsing “some” confidence, and only 15% reporting “very little or 
none” (Saad, 2018). For police to be effective administrators of justice, they must be seen as 
legitimate authority figures who are deserving of deference and obedience. The procedural 
justice perspective suggests that police gain legitimacy when the processes through which 
authority is exercised and decisions are made are perceived to be fair. When people have trust 
and confidence in police legitimacy, they are more likely to cooperate with police and to support 
policies that empower police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In a recent international review, Jackson 
(2018) found that procedural justice continues to be the strongest predictor of people’s subjective 
belief about whether an institution is entitled to power and obedience (i.e., police legitimacy). 
However, a perceived failure to hold police accountable for wrongful instances of fatal force has 
led to poorer assessments of police fairness and legitimacy (Park, 2018), particularly among 
communities of color (e.g., for a review, see Peck, 2015).  
Several demographic and social characteristics have a robust relationship with attitudes 
toward police: race (Park, 2018), social context (Braga, Winship, & Tyler, 2014), neighborhood 
context (Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2003; Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2015), and direct 
and vicarious contact with the police (Augustyn, 2016; Fine, Cavanagh, Steinberg, Frick, & 
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Cauffman, 2016). Some research has shown significant effects of age (Jefferis, et al., 1997; 
McLean, Wolfe, & Pratt, 2019), political ideology (e.g., for a review, see Brown & Benedict, 
2002), and level of education (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; for a review, see Brown & Benedict, 
2002)—with highly educated young people being more skeptical of police legitimacy. 
Rosenbaum and colleagues (2005) found that, although direct contact with police in the year 
prior did not influence attitudes, learning about another person’s positive or negative experience 
with police accordingly shifted attitudes toward police in positive or negative directions.  
In contrast to jurors with more skeptical or negative attitudes toward police (e.g., Black 
Americans, Weitzer, Tuch, & Skogan, 2008; liberals, Ekins, 2016), jurors with positive attitudes 
toward police are more likely to view police officers as guardians—the good guys who are 
trained and trusted to carry weapons in defense of the general public. Indeed, the mere presence 
of a police officer in uniform seems to have a powerful impact, making people more likely to 
accept and comply with orders, no matter how strange (e.g. give a dime to a stranger, Bickman, 
1974). Evidence has also shown that police officers wearing traditional (versus more civilian-
styled) uniforms are perceived as more competent, honest, helpful, good, more valuable, and 
possessing better judgment (Mauro, 1984; Nickels, 2008).  
Attitudes toward police use of force. Most studies on perceptions of police use of force 
have focused on general attitudes. For example, evidence has shown that a majority of the 
general public (60%) believes that fatal police use of force against Black individuals in recent 
years is a sign of a broader problem (Morin, Parker, Stepler, Mercer, 2017). Unsurprisingly, 
Black Americans (73%) are more likely than White (35%) or Hispanic (54%) Americans to say 
that police officers are too quick to use fatal force (Ekins, 2016). However, some social groups 
are more supportive of police use of force. For example, political conservatives endorse more 
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positive attitudes toward police use of force than do liberals (Ekins, 2016; Gerber & Jackson, 
2017; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2004; Stack & Cao, 1998). 
Studies investigating people’s reactions to specific use-of-force incidents have increased 
over time (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2017; Celestin & Kruschke, 2018; Gerber & Jackson, 
2017; Jefferis, Butcher, & Hanley, 2011; Weitzer, 2002). Predictably, people who have positive 
attitudes toward police legitimacy are more likely to accept specific instances of fatal use of 
force by police (Celestin & Kruschke, 2018). People who identify strongly with certain social 
groups (i.e., law-abiding citizens) are also more likely to accept instances of police use of force 
than people who do not identify strongly with those social groups, regardless of whether the 
force seemed justified or not (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2017).  Law enforcement agencies 
use decision rules for determining the appropriate level of force police officers should use in 
response to various types of dangerous citizen conflict (i.e., force continuum). Celestin and 
Kruschke (2019) found that, although police officers are taught to subdue dangerous suspects 
with a higher level of force than that which confronts them, the public actually expects police 
officers to respond at a level of force that is lower than the threat exhibited by the suspect. 
Similarly, Jefferis and colleagues (2011) found that most people believed police officers use too 
much force in relation to the level of resistance demonstrated by suspects. Furthermore, results 
from a recent analysis of reactions to specific use of force instances from 1990 to 2018 
demonstrated that, over time, people have become more disapproving of legally reasonable, 
justifiable use of fatal force by police (Mourtgos & Adams, 2019). In the following sections, I 
will discuss some theoretical models of how jurors’ pre-existing attitudes can ultimately come to 
shape their verdict decisions. 
 Story model of juror decision making.  According to the story model of jury decision-
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making (Pennington & Hastie, 1981; 1988; Ellsworth, 1993), jurors’ beliefs about police might 
provide the narrative framework for how jurors interpret evidence and instructions in fatal use of 
force cases. Importantly, the cause and effect narrative jurors construct in cases where police 
officers used fatal force against a suspect might be shaped by their pre-existing attitudes toward 
police. The story model holds that jurors organize trial information (e.g., evidence, attorney 
statements, witness statements, etc.) into a narrative account and construct a cause and effect 
story to explain what happened. Creating a narrative story enables individual jurors to better 
understand the evidence and to decide their initial, pre-deliberation verdict choice. However, in 
addition to the evidence presented at trial, jurors rely on their existing knowledge of similar cases 
or crimes, and their own general expectations and experiences with case-related issues when 
constructing a narrative story of the trial events (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Indeed, Ellsworth 
(1993) reported that jurors existing beliefs guide them to construct general “stereotyped themes” 
to summarize the trial events. For example, “Hero cop fatally shoots dangerous criminal,” versus 
“Reckless cop fatally shoots petty thief.” Jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward 
police are more likely to view police officers as the “good guys” (Weitzer, et al., 2008; Ekins, 
2016). As such, jurors with positive attitudes toward police who are evaluating a fatal use of 
force case would construct a narrative in which the police officer is a hero, doing his duty to stop 
a dangerous criminal. In contrast, jurors with negative attitudes toward police would create a 
narrative in which the police officer was reckless in shooting a harmless victim.  
Cognitive consistency theory of juror decision making. According to cognitive 
consistency theories (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Simon, et 
al., 2004) people are motivated to seek coherent and consistent attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, 
values, feelings, and behaviors. When inconsistencies arise, this produces a state of tension (i.e., 
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dissonance) and motivates the person to reduce the cognitive discomfort. To reduce the tension, 
people will work to make their relevant case-related cognitions consistent with their pre-existing 
beliefs. Thus, it might be difficult for jurors with positive attitudes toward police to cast police 
officers in the role of aggressor in fatal use of force trials. Jurors trying to reconcile long-held 
beliefs that a trusted and respected police officer could be guilty of intentionally hurting a citizen 
while serving in the line of duty are likely to experience the discomfort of cognitive dissonance. 
Similarly, jurors with negative attitudes toward police might have an equally difficult time 
reconciling their belief that police officers are not to be trusted with evidence that the officer 
responded reasonably in the face of a serious threat. 
In line with the story model, cognitive consistency theories hold that jurors have a 
propensity to build stories that are coherent and consistent with their prior beliefs and 
knowledge. As such, the way they interpret information and reason about their decisions is 
susceptible to judgment biases (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004). Specifically, jurors 
engage in a process by which they attend more closely to one perspective of the evidence and 
dismiss alternative perspectives (Simon et al., 2004). Engaging in such a process makes difficult 
judgments more palatable to jurors and allows them to achieve cognitive consistency while 
constructing a coherent story to explain the evidence presented to them at trial.  
Thus, jurors’ attitudes toward police are likely to provide the framework for how jurors 
attend to and interpret evidence in fatal police use of force cases (Carlson & Russo, 2001). 
Particularly, jurors with negative attitudes toward police would be more likely to notice and pay 
attention to evidence that supports guilt (i.e., prosecution evidence) and to be more critical and/or 
dismissive of evidence that supports the police officer’s need to use deadly force (i.e., defense 
evidence). In contrast, jurors with positive attitudes toward police would be more likely to attend 
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to evidence that exonerates the officer (i.e., defense evidence) and to discount or disregard any 
evidence that suggests guilt (i.e., prosecution evidence).  
Jury Instructions in Fatal Use of Force Trials  
Jury instructions for criminal trials of police officers are adapted almost exclusively from 
civil, rather than criminal, pattern instructions. Specifically, First Circuit criminal pattern 
instructions state that police officers should be treated the same as other defendants, and the Fifth 
Circuit criminal pattern instructions indicate that police use of force claims should be evaluated 
under the Fourth Amendment according to Graham (1989). Otherwise, criminal pattern 
instructions do not mention or provide specific guidance on judging police officers who have 
been accused of unlawful use of deadly force. 
In the 1985 case of Tennessee v. Garner (1985), police officers shot and killed Edward 
Garner—who the officers acknowledged did not appear to be armed—with hollow-point bullets 
as he tried to escape capture by jumping over a fence. Garner’s family filed a wrongful death 
suit, but the district court sided with the officers in saying that Garner assumed the risk of being 
shot during his reckless escape attempt. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, however, that decision was reversed on grounds that killing a fleeing suspect is a 
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. As such, a seizure is only reasonable when the suspect 
poses a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large. The U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld this decision and established new precedent for legally defining the ‘objective 
reasonableness standard’ of police officer behavior according to Fourth Amendment standards 
for reasonable search and seizure. In the written opinion, the Justices provided a specific list of 
factors to consider in determining whether the totality of circumstances justified a particular use 
of force (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent persons from officer behavior considered, 
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presence/absence of deadly weapon, attempts to temper/limit force, whether warning was given, 
etc.). Although the list of relatively objective factors seemed to be a promising start in 
establishing guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of deadly 
force, the details of this ruling often fade to the background of a well-known case that followed.  
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruling in Graham v. Connor cemented the legal requirement 
that claims of excessive police use of force should be analyzed according to the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person. Dethorne Graham, who 
was diabetic, entered a store to purchase orange juice to counter an insulin reaction. Graham 
quickly exited after seeing a long line at the counter. A police officer found Graham’s unusually 
quick entrance and exit from the store suspicious and pulled him over. Due to the worsening 
insulin reaction, Graham was uncooperative, he exhibited strange behavior, and he was unable to 
communicate his condition. Additional officers arrived on the scene and violently subdued 
Graham. The officers eventually learned that no crime had taken place at the convenience store 
and returned Graham to his home. As a result of the incident, Graham suffered cuts on his wrist, 
a bruised forehead, a broken bone in his foot, an injured shoulder, and persistent ringing in his 
ears. He subsequently filed suit against the officers for unlawful excessive use of force.  
District and appellate courts both denied Graham’s claim based on previous Eighth 
Amendment standards requiring a ‘subjective inquiry’ into whether the officers acted with 
malicious and sadistic intent. The Supreme Court, however, expanded the precedent set in 
Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and unanimously ruled that Graham’s claim—as well as all other 
claims of excessive force—are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 
reasonableness” standard. The ruling in Graham v. Connor (1989) validated the precedent set in 
the 1985 Connor case and outlined additional factors to consider when evaluating the 
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reasonableness of force that stressed the importance of balancing citizens’ right to be free of 
unreasonable seizure with police officers’ right to safely perform their duties. Specifically, the 
ruling focused legal actor’s attention to the superseding moment, or the very narrow point in time 
during which an officer decides to use deadly force (e.g., “…police officers are often forced to 
make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving...”). Hence, the justice system was compelled to institute policies and practices that are 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and as such, has slowly—and inconsistently—
incorporated the language provided in Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor 
(1989) in the instructions given to jurors in excessive and/or fatal use of force trials.  
Once established in Graham v. Connor (1989), the new ‘reasonableness standard’ was 
expected to increase the likelihood that police officers would be held accountable for excessive 
use of force (MacDonald, 1990). However, it is possible that the language adapted from these 
Supreme Court rulings and used to instruct jurors in unlawful use of force trials might have 
unintended consequences on how jurors perceive and process information when determining 
police officer guilt. Indeed, some legal scholars have argued that Graham-based instructions tend 
to be inconsistent and favorable to police, allowing officers to make “exaggerated claims 
regarding the dangerousness of police work,” to justify the use of fatal force (Gross, 2016). 
Indeed, it is possible that the language in Graham (1989) might lead jurors to engage in 
perspective-taking behavior and to give greater consideration to the officer’s subjective 
experience in the moment (e.g. “reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene…the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.”). In 
contrast, providing jurors with the list of relatively objective factors (e.g., crime is for a felony, 
presence/absence of deadly weapon, attempts to temper/limit force, warning was given, etc.) 
15 
 
from Tennessee v. Garner (1989) might prompt a more deliberate and objective mindset.  
My review of published US Appellate Circuit Court jury pattern instructions—available 
online from all US Appellate Courts, except the Second and Fourth Circuits—uncovered 
substantial inconsistencies in how courts instruct jurors about evaluating fatal police use of force. 
Specifically, some instructions incorporated language from Graham (First, Third, and Fifth 
Circuit), others incorporated language from Garner (Seventh Circuit), and still yet, others 
contained limited (Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit) or detailed (Ninth Circuit) language from 
both.  
The Effect of Jury Instructions on Jurors’ Decision Making  
In an effort to establish professional standards for acceptable jury decision-making 
research practices, Lieberman, Krauss, Heen, and Sakiyama (2016) sampled authors of jury 
decision-making studies, editorial board members, and journal editors over a 5-year period. The 
inclusion of jury instructions was rated as the most important specific trial element required for 
acceptable jury-decision making research. This is not surprising, given that the content of jury 
instructions is the only direct information jurors are given about the legal standards they are to 
apply when evaluating the evidence presented to them at trial.  
There are several reasons to expect that superseding moment instructions would lead to 
more lenient verdicts than totality of circumstance instructions. First, although jurors with 
positive attitudes toward police are already expected to convict at lower rates regardless of 
instruction type, superseding moment instructions might exacerbate the influence of attitudes on 
verdicts by a.) instructing jurors to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness and b.) by 
encouraging jurors to engage in perspective-taking. Specifically, cognitive experiential self-
theory (Epstein, 1994) suggests that inducing a subjective standard of reasonableness leads to 
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shallow experiential information processing and a greater reliance on existing attitudes and 
beliefs. Superseding moment instructions might encourage jurors to adopt such a subjective 
standard of reasonableness, which would lead to shallow information processing and might lead 
jurors to focus on attitude-congruent evidence (i.e., defense evidence for pro-police jurors and 
prosecution evidence for anti-police jurors). Moreover, perspective-taking increases empathy for 
defendants (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014) and has also been shown to 
decrease stereotyping and ingroup favoritism (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Perhaps superseding 
moment instructions would encourage not only jurors with positive attitudes toward police, but 
also those with negative attitudes, to have more empathy toward the officer, and to render fewer 
convictions.  
Second, totality of circumstance instructions might promote an objective reasonableness 
standard by providing a list of specific factors for jurors to consider (e.g., crime is for a felony, 
risk to innocent persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if 
suspect not apprehended, warning given when feasible), which is absent from superseding 
moment instructions. Research has shown that jurors who are guided to think objectively and 
rationally tend to render more impartial verdicts than jurors who are guided to think subjectively 
and experientially (Krauss et al., 2004; Lieberman et al., 2007; Terrance et al., 2006). Hence, 
jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions might be less susceptible to the influence of 
existing attitudes and make more objective evaluations of the evidence, which would lead to 
higher conviction rates when the officer did not act in accordance with the standards outlined in 
the instructions.  
Third, superseding moment language might also influence verdicts by focusing juror’s 
attention on the very narrow point in time when the officer decided to use force (i.e., “…the 
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standard of reasonableness at the moment applies… split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving…”). Focusing juror’s attention on this small 
moment may lead jurors—particularly those with positive attitudes toward the police—to rely 
more heavily on prosecution (versus defense) evidence and to render fewer guilty verdicts. In 
contrast, totality of circumstance instructions might guide jurors to take a more global focus by 
instructing them to consider all the contextual factors (e.g., “…reasonableness…depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors you may consider…”). Regardless of 
their pre-trial attitudes toward police, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions would 
render more convictions than jurors who read superseding moment or control instructions.  
The moderating effect of jury instructions on juror’s attitudes. Jury instructions 
might decrease the biasing influence of attitudes in some situations (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991) and 
increase the influence of attitudes in other situations (Meissner, Brigham, & Pfeifer, 2003; Peter-
Hagene and Bottoms, 2017). For example, Pfiefer and Ogloff (1991) demonstrated that, although 
participants tend to overwhelmingly rate Black (versus White) defendants as more guilty, the 
effect disappears when participants receive instructions to not let prejudice or bias influence their 
verdicts.  In contrast, jury instructions can also increase the biasing effect of pre-existing 
attitudes and beliefs on verdicts (Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017; Peter-Hagene & Ratliff, 2020). 
Specifically, jury nullification occurs when—despite clear evidence of guilt—a jury finds a 
defendant not guilty because rendering a guilty verdict would violate their own sense of moral 
justice. Jury nullification is especially likely in cases with morally ambiguous crimes (e.g., 
euthanasia, marijuana possession) when instructions explicitly allow jurors to follow their own 
beliefs rather than the strict rule of law. In such cases, jurors render verdicts that are consistent 
with their pre-existing attitudes. For example, Peter-Hagene and Ratliff (2020) had participants 
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evaluate a mock euthanasia trial in which a defendant was accused of committing a mercy 
killing. Jurors with pro-euthanasia (versus anti-euthanasia) attitudes were overall less likely to 
render convictions, but particularly when the instructions informed jurors of their legal right to 
follow their own conscience rather than the law. Nullification instructions bolstered the effect of 
attitudes on verdicts by encouraging jurors to rely on their feelings of moral outrage toward the 
law. 
Totality of circumstance instructions adapted from the Garner (1985) ruling are written in 
plain language and provide a relatively objective list of factors for jurors to consider when 
determining whether the use of lethal force was justified (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to 
innocent persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if suspect 
not apprehended, warning given when feasible). Thus, perhaps totality of circumstance 
instructions would prompt a more careful and rational evaluation of the officer’s behavior. As a 
result, totality of circumstance instructions would lead to an increased likelihood that jurors 
would be more sensitive to the specific factors that determine the reasonableness of an officer’s 
actions. As such, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions would render verdicts 
consistent with the evidence, rather than their personal beliefs and attitudes.  
The effect of jury instructions on juror’s approach to evaluating evidence. Although 
changing jurors’ attitudes about police to ensure impartial verdicts is unlikely, jury instructions 
can induce the mindset (i.e., way of thinking about/approaching tasks) with which jurors 
approach their task (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2008). For example, seeing a police officer defendant 
might prime jurors with the concept of police officers, which would then activate related 
concepts such as badge, gun, or crime fighting in memory. Jury instructions, however, induce 
certain mindsets in jurors by advising them of the legal guidelines and criteria they are to follow 
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in making their determinations.  
Research on mindset priming investigates how instructing or encouraging participants to 
think in specific ways can affect behavioral outcomes (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer, 
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). For example, 
Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989) found that people who were primed with a deliberative mindset 
(i.e., instructed to make a decision) developed a different way of approaching tasks than people 
who were primed with an implemental mindset (i.e., instructed to implement a specific goal).  
According to cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), mindsets, or information 
processing modes, are either experiential or rational. Experiential reasoning tends to be the 
default processing mode because it is efficient and requires less effort by relying on existing 
attitudes and beliefs. Rational processing, however, is more analytic and effortful. For example, 
Krauss and colleagues (2004) primed participants in a death penalty trial with a mindset to think 
experientially (i.e., draw picture of current emotional state) or rationally (complete a math 
worksheet) and then exposed participants to expert witness testimony about the dangerousness of 
the defendant. Jurors primed with a rational mindset considered fact-based (versus emotional) 
testimony and jurors primed with an experiential mindset were more influenced by emotional 
(versus fact-based) testimony.  
Results from studies into the effects of inducing rational (versus experiential) mindsets in 
jurors through the use of jury instructions (e.g., Lieberman et al., 2007) parallel findings from 
research investigating the effects of directing jurors to adopt objective versus subjective 
standards of reasonableness when determining guilt. For example, in a mock murder trial of a 
wife who murdered her abusive husband, Terrance and colleagues (2006) instructed jurors to 
adopt either an objective (e.g., “must consider how an ordinary person, operating reasonably 
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under the circumstances…would have responded.”) or a subjective (e.g., “not to be judged by 
what an average person might consider reasonable…instead by what the defendant honestly 
believed…”) standard of reasonableness when determining guilt. Jurors who received objective 
(versus subjective) instructions were more likely to convict. Therefore, jurors who are guided to 
think objectively and rationally tend to render more impartial verdicts while jurors who are 
guided to think subjectively and experientially tend to render verdicts that are more consistent 
with pre-existing attitudes and beliefs. 
Similarly, superseding moment instructions adapted from the Graham ruling (1989) 
encourage jurors evaluating instances of fatal police use of force to consider the officer’s 
subjective experience in the moment force was used (e.g., “the standard of reasonableness at the 
moment applies…police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments…”). Thus, 
superseding moment instructions guide jurors to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness 
and, in turn, might lead to an increased chance that pre-existing attitudes would influence 
verdicts. According to cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), this is because inducing 
a subjective standard of reasonableness leads to a reliance on existing attitudes and beliefs, with 
shallow, experiential information processing. Therefore, jurors with positive attitudes toward 
police who read superseding moment instructions might give greater consideration to 
prosecution (versus defense) evidence.  
In contrast, totality of circumstance instructions outline an objective standard of 
reasonableness and provide impartial information to consider when determining officer guilt 
(e.g., crime was for a felony, efforts to temper or limit force, warning was given, etc.). Hence, 
totality of circumstance instructions might prompt a more rational approach and lead jurors to 
render more objective verdicts based on equal consideration of both prosecution and defense 
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evidence. Specifically, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions should be more 
willing to render guilty verdicts if an officer’s behavior does not satisfy the objective standard 
requirements outlined in the jury instructions.   
The effect of jury instructions on perspective-taking. When people engage in 
perspective-taking by making a deliberate effort to imagine themselves in another person’s 
position, they are more likely to feel empathy with that person (Chambers & Davis, 2012; Davis, 
1983). In some cases, perspective-taking has been shown to decrease stereotyping and ingroup 
favoritism (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Furthermore, when jury instructions encourage jurors to take 
the defendant’s perspective, jurors are more likely to express empathy for, and to ultimately 
acquit, the defendant (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014). For example, 
Haegerich and Bottoms (2000) found that having mock jurors engage in perspective-taking when 
evaluating a 15-year old defendant charged with patricide for killing her sexually abusive father 
led to increased empathy for the defendant and fewer guilty verdicts. Similarly, Skorinko and 
colleagues (2014) embedded perspective-taking language in jury instructions in a mock vehicular 
manslaughter trial. The authors found that perspective-taking led jurors to perceive the defendant 
as less culpable, which, in turn, indirectly resulted in seeing the defendant as less guilty. The 
language in superseding moment instructions explicitly encourages jurors to engage in 
perspective-taking (e.g., “…must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer…forced 
to make split-second judgments…”). Thus, jurors who read superseding moment (versus totality 
of circumstance or control) instructions would be expected to imagine themselves in the officer’s 
position during a fatal use of force incident, which may increase juror empathy for the officer, 





In an experimental mock-jury study, the content of jury instructions for first-degree 
murder were manipulated to be consistent with either totality of circumstance language 
(Tennessee v. Garner, 1985) or superseding moment language (Graham v. Connor, 1989), along 
with a control condition that did not contain any police-specific language and instead consisted 
of pattern jury instructions for first-degree murder in general. All participants provided informed 
consent. Attitudes toward police were measured as a continuous predictor and were 
counterbalanced before and after the trial. Participants were asked to provide ratings of  
prosecution  evidence importance, indicate the extent to which they engaged in perspective-
taking, complete a memory for case facts questionnaire, manipulation checks, and a suspicion 
item, as well as provide demographic information. The importance of prosecution evidence and 
perspective-taking were measured as potential mediators. The dependent measures were verdicts.  
Hypotheses 
H1: The content of jury instructions and attitudes toward police would predict guilty 
verdicts.  
H1.a: I hypothesized a main effect of instructions. Jurors who read totality instructions 
were expected to convict at higher rates than jurors who read superseding moment instructions or 
control instructions. Jurors who read superseding moment instructions were expected to convict 
at lower rates than participants in the control condition. See Figure 1.     
H1.b: I hypothesized a main effect of positive attitudes toward police. Jurors with 
more positive (versus more negative) attitudes toward police were expected to convict at lower 
rates. See Figure 1.     
H1.c: I hypothesized an interaction between instruction content and positive 
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attitudes toward the police. The predictive power of attitudes for verdicts would vary, 
depending on the type of instruction. Because existing beliefs are likely to influence jurors’ 
perceptions of evidence, attitudes toward police would predict verdicts for jurors who read 
control instructions, which contained no specific guidance on evaluating police officer 
defendants. Specifically, jurors in the control condition with positive (versus negative) attitudes 
toward police would convict more often than jurors who read superseding moment instructions, 
but less often than jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions. Moreover, several 
factors (i.e., attitude-consistent information, lack of objective instruction, perspective-taking, 
narrow focus) suggested that attitudes would predict verdicts for jurors who read superseding 
moment instructions. Jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward police who read 
superseding moment instructions would be significantly less likely to convict than similar jurors 
who read totality of circumstance or control instructions. Finally, because jurors who read 
totality instructions are guided to make a more objective evaluation of the evidence, the 
predictive power of attitudes was not expected to be significant for them. See Figure 1.     
H2: I hypothesized that the importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking 
would mediate the relationship between positive attitudes and verdicts, with mediation 
being moderated by instruction type. Jurors’ attitudes might influence verdicts by guiding 
jurors to attend more closely to pieces of evidence that are consistent (versus inconsistent) with 
their pre-existing attitudes (Ellsworth, 1993; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Pennington & Hastie, 
1993; Simon et al., 2004), Therefore, jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward 
police would attribute greater importance to defense evidence while jurors with more negative 
(versus positive) attitudes toward police would attribute more importance to prosecution 
evidence. In turn, the importance of prosecution evidence would influence verdicts, such that 
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jurors who attributed greater importance to prosecution evidence would be expected to convict 
the officer most often.  
 However, this mediation would depend on the moderating effect of instruction type. 
Specifically, jurors who read totality of circumstance (versus superseding moment) instructions 
would give equal consideration to prosecution and defense evidence, and, in turn, render verdicts 
that were consistent with the evidence, rather than their personal beliefs. In contrast, superseding 
moment instructions would guide jurors to adopt a subjective (versus objective) standard of 
reasonableness and to rely more heavily on their own attitudes and beliefs when rendering their 
verdicts. Therefore, the attitudes of jurors who read superseding moment (versus totality of 
circumstance) instructions were expected to predict the importance of prosecution evidence, and 
ultimately, guilty verdicts. Positive attitudes toward police would predict the importance of 
prosecution evidence and guilty verdicts in the control condition to a lesser degree than 
superseding moment instructions and to a greater degree than the totality of circumstance 
instructions. See Figure 2. 
Perspective-taking has been shown to lead to increased empathy (Chambers & Davis, 
2012) and ultimately fewer guilty verdicts (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014). 
Thus, I hypothesized that, for jurors who read superseding moment instructions and were told to 
take the perspective of the officer in the moment, jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes 
toward police would be significantly more likely to engage in perspective taking and, in turn, to 
acquit the officer. Because jurors who read totality instructions are guided to make a more 
objective evaluation of the evidence, the effect of perspective-taking on verdicts would not be 
significant. For jurors who read control instructions, jurors with positive (versus negative) 
attitudes toward police would be significantly more likely to engage in perspective-taking, and to 
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I employed a community sample of Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers in order to obtain 
a reasonably diverse sample (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Workers received payment 
of $2.00 for their participation. A minimum sample of N = 158 was necessary for detecting a 
main effect of moderate effect size (f = .25) for the main effect of instruction content on verdicts 
with 80% power. To ensure adequate power for testing interaction effects, I recruited more than 
four times as many participants (Maxwell, 2004). Participants were N = 645 jury eligible U.S. 
citizens recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Due to failed manipulation checks 
(N = 34) checks and poor memory for case facts (N = 75), 106 participants were excluded from 
analysis. Two items testing memory for case facts (i.e., “Mike Smith, the defendant, testified that 
he repeatedly instructed Shawn Davis to “drop the knife and get down on the ground before I 
shoot.” ; Nathan Miller, a defense witness, testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking 
toward the officers.”) were deemed faulty and excluded from analysis after nearly half of all 
participants failed both items.  
Of the final sample of N = 539, most participants were women (55%). The majority of 
participants were White (79.8%); participants also identified as Black (9.3%), Hispanic (3.9%), 
Asian (4.8%), Other (1.3%), and American Indian or Alaska Native (.9%). I conducted 
comparative analyses to determine if there were any significant differences between the 
participants who were excluded from analyses and those who were retained. An independent 
samples t-test revealed significant differences in age between excluded participants and those 
retained for the analysis (t(633) = -3.09, p = .002). Participants who failed the memory and 
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manipulation checks tended to be younger (M = 38.49, SD = 12.73) than participants who passed 
the memory and manipulation checks (M = 43.13, SD = 13.96). Chi-squared analyses revealed 
no differences between the excluded participants and those retained for the sample on the 
following demographic variables: gender (χ² (N = 635) = 3.58, p = .167), level of education  (χ² 
(N = 635) = 1.19, p = .881), living environment (χ² (N = 635) = 4.84, p = .089), and recent 
interactions with police (χ² (N = 635) = 3.24, p = .072). 
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Data collection 
took place between March 14, 2020 and March 18, 2020. Because Mechanical Turk samples are 
known to be more politically liberal, with 34 - 46% of participants indicating they are democrats 
and only 15 - 22% indicating they are republicans (Levay et al., 2016), I oversampled 
conservatives to obtain a more politically balanced sample. Specifically, because liberal 
Mechanical Turk participants are likely to outnumber conservative participants by an average of 
14%, I purposefully recruited 90 participants who identified as political moderates or 
conservatives in order to increase the number of conservatives in the full sample by 14%. In the 
final sample, 48.8% of participants identified as liberal, 16.4% identified as moderate, and 34.9% 
identified as conservative. Participants were relatively well-educated with 13.7% having a 
graduate or professional degree, 44% having a bachelor’s degree, 29.3% reporting some college, 
11.5% having a high school diploma or GED, and only 0.7% reporting less than a high school 
degree. Additionally, most participants (52.3%) reported living in suburban areas, while 25.6% 
reporting living in urban areas and another 22.1% reporting living in rural areas. Four 
participants did not report their living environment. Because removal of these participants did 





 Materials and measures are listed here in the order in which they were presented to the 
participants.  
Consent and eligibility (Appendix A). Participants responded to two yes/no items to 
verify their eligibility to participate in the study (i.e., over 18-years old, U.S. citizen) and verified 
their informed consent.  
Positive attitudes toward police questionnaire (Appendix B). Participants completed a 
9-item measure of positive attitudes toward police adapted from Jackson and colleagues (2018). 
Although items from the scale have been widely used in similar research on juror’s reactions to 
specific incidents of police use of force (e.g., Bradford, et al., 2017; Gerber & Jackson, 2017), 
the updated scale was selected for its ability to better characterize various dimensions of personal 
beliefs about police officers. Specifically, participants rated their level of disagreement 
/agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) with statements regarding bounded 
authority (3-items; e.g., “When the police deal with people they almost always behave according 
to the law.”), police legitimacy and normative alignment (3-items; e.g., “Police stand up for 
values that are important to me.”), and police officers’ neutral decision making (3-items; e.g., 
“Police give people the opportunity to tell their side of the story before making any decisions.”). 
The positive attitudes toward police measure was counterbalanced such that half of participants 
completed the measure before viewing trial-related materials and the other half completed the 
measure after viewing the trial materials, rendering their verdicts, indicating the extent to which 
they found the officer guilty, and completed measures of the importance of prosecution evidence 
and perspective-taking. Pre- versus post administration of the positive attitudes toward police 
measure was used to create the counterbalancing variable (pre-trial = 0, post-trial = 1).  
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There was no missing data. The scale was created by averaging item responses and was 
found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .93). Responses indicated overall positive 
attitudes toward police (M = 3.47, SD = .90) Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the 
attitudes toward police measure for the overall sample.  
Pre-trial jury instructions (Appendix C). Pre-trial instructions informed all jurors that 
the defendant had pleaded not guilty to the charge of first-degree murder and reminded them of 
the presumption of innocence and of their duty to render impartial verdicts. Pre-trial instructions 
also included the experimental manipulation: totality instructions (adapted from Tennessee v. 
Garner,1985), superseding moment instructions (adapted from Graham v. Connor, 1989), or 
control instructions with no additional police-specific language.  
 Participants in the superseding moment condition received pre-trial instructions with the 
following additional language:  
“The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective  
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With 
respect to a claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness in the moment 
applies. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary, violates the 
Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.” 
 
Participants in the totality of circumstance condition received pre-trial instructions with 
the following additional language:  
“Reasonableness depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors 
you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was unreasonable 
include, without limitation: The need for the force used; The relationship between the 
need for the use of force and the amount of force used; The extent of the victim’s injury; 
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force; The severity of 
the crime at issue; The threat reasonably perceived by the officer; Whether the victim was 
actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if the victim was 
attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably 
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appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.”  
 
Trial stimulus (Appendix D). The trial summary was adapted from the 2018 trial of 
Chicago police officer Jason VanDyke, who was convicted in the shooting death of 17-year old 
Laquan McDonald (State of Illinois vs. Jason VanDyke). All names were replaced with fictitious 
names. For example, Jason VanDyke was replaced with “Mike Smith” and Laquan McDonald 
was replaced with “Shawn Davis.” Participants viewed a presentation of 12 slides, which 
consisted of opening and closing statements from the prosecution and defense, evidence, and 
witness testimony. On the first slide of the trial presentation, participants read the prosecutor’s 
opening statement, in which she argued the officer was guilty of murder because a Taser unit 
was in route, other officers on the scene did not feel the need to fire their weapons, and the 
victim appeared to be walking away from officers at the time of the shooting, as revealed in 
screenshots from a poor quality dashcam video. On the second slide, participants read the 
defense attorney’s opening statements, in which he argued the victim had been stealing and 
terrorizing people with a knife and that the officer acted according to his training in response to a 
reasonable fear for his life, and the life of others.  
Next, participants read summaries of trial testimony from four prosecution witnesses, 
each presented on separate slides. Prosecution evidence included a map of the area where the 
incident started to where it finished, the coroner’s report, and two still photos from a dashcam 
video. Images of evidence accompanied the witness testimony to which they were related. For 
instance, one prosecution witness testified to having followed the victim for several blocks and 
not having felt that his life was in danger; that testimony was accompanied by the map of the 
area. Then, participants read trial testimony from four defense witnesses, again with each 
presented on separate slides. Defense evidence included photos of a damaged police cruiser, a 
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map showing the proximity to nearby restaurants, and a transcript of the 911 audio call. In line 
with the presentation of prosecution evidence, defense evidence was presented to participants 
within slides containing related witness testimony. Finally, participants viewed one slide 
featuring the prosecutor’s closing statement and one slide featuring the defense attorney’s 
closing statement.  
Post-trial jury instructions (Appendix E). Post-trial instructions were adapted from 
Illinois pattern jury instructions but were truncated for ease of clarity for participants. These 
instructions advised jurors of their duties, advised against the influence of sympathy or prejudice, 
and reminded jurors that the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty. Much like the 
pre-trial instructions, post-trial instructions contained the same added manipulation of instruction 
type (i.e., totality, superseding moment, control). Additionally, post-trial instructions included 
the following definition of first-degree murder: 
A person commits the offense of first degree murder when he kills an individual [without 
lawful justification] if, in performing the acts which cause the death, [1] he intends to kill 
or do great bodily harm to that individual [or another]; [or] [2] he knows that such acts 
will cause death to that individual [or another]; [or]  [3] he knows that such acts create a 
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual [or another]; [or]  [4] 
he [(is attempting to commit) (is committing)] the offense of ____. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should go on with your deliberations to decide 
whether a mitigating factor has been proved so that the defendant is guilty of the lesser 
offense of second-degree murder instead of first-degree murder. 
 
Dependent Measures  
Individual verdicts (Appendix F). Participants provided verdict decisions (guilty/not-
guilty) and the degree to which they found the defendant guilty (7-point scale: definitely not 
guilty to definitely guilty). Although jurors are never asked to provide such ratings of guilt in 
actual trial decisions, the measure is valuable in jury decision-making research, as it provides 
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information about juror’s level of certainty in their verdict, and also allows for additional 
analyses that are not possible with dichotomous verdicts. A majority of jurors rendered guilty 
verdicts (N = 223, 58.6%) and overall, jurors were somewhat confident that the officer was guilty 
(M = 4.46, SD = 2.07). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the continuous guilt measure for 
the overall sample. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix for dependent measures, mediators, and 
the moderator. 
The Importance of Prosecution Evidence (Appendix G). An initial measure of 10 
items, including 5 defense items and 5 prosecution items, tested participant’s evaluations of 
evidence importance. The items measuring importance of defense evidence were dropped due to 
poor model fit, the final scale was created based on the items that more directly assessed the 
conceptual variable of interest: importance assigned to incriminating prosecution evidence. In 
order to determine the extent to which participants valued prosecution evidence, participants 
rated the importance of 5 elements of prosecution evidence to their verdict decision (i.e., 
“Officer Joseph Collins followed Shawn Davis on foot for blocks and did not feel his life was in 
danger.” ; “Every officer knew that a Taser unit was on the way.” ; “Shawn Davis was shot 16 
times.” ; “The dashcam photos appeared to show Shawn Davis walking away from the officer.” ; 
“According to a law enforcement educator, Officer Mike Smith should have tried to de-escalate 
the situation.”). This was a 5-point scale (1 = Extremely important, 5 = Not at all important). 
Items were recoded such that higher scores indicated the importance of prosecution evidence and 
responses to the scale were averaged. There was no missing data. The scale produced adequate 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) and indicated high ratings of prosecution evidence 
importance (M = 3.70, SD = .97). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the importance of 
prosecution evidence for the overall sample.  
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Perspective-taking (Appendix H). On a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly 
disagree), participants rated their level of disagreement/agreement with three items regarding the 
extent to which they tried to imagine how the officer felt, what the officer thought, and how 
things looked from the officer’s perspective (e.g., “I tried to imagine how I would feel if I were 
in the officer’s place.”). The three items were adapted from the 7-item Perspective-taking 
subscale of the 28-item Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Items were recoded 
such that higher scores indicated higher levels of perspective taking and responses to the scale 
were averaged. There was no missing data. The perspective-taking scale was highly reliable in 
the current sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .93) and indicated high levels of perspective-taking (M = 
5.98, SD = 1.14). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the perspective-taking measure for 
the overall sample. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix for dependent measures, mediators, and 
the moderator. 
Memory for case facts (Appendix I). An 8-item true (e.g. “Shawn Davis popped a tire 
on a police cruiser with a knife.”) and false (e.g., “The coroner’s report identified 13 entry 
wounds.”) questionnaire measured participant’s recognition of case facts. Participants had to 
reach at least 60% accuracy to be included in the study.  
Manipulation check (Appendix J). Participants responded to two yes/no items in order 
to verify whether the instructions contained a.) superseding moment language (e.g., “…calculus 
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving…”) or b.) totality of circumstance language (e.g., …”The need for the force used; The 
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; The extent of the 
victim’s injury; Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force. 
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Participants had to answer this item correctly to be included in the study.   
Conceptual manipulation checks (Appendix K). Four conceptual manipulation check 
questions assessed whether the manipulations had the intended theoretical effect on participants 
(e.g., “The jury instructions encouraged me to rely on my own attitudes and beliefs,” ; “The jury 
instructions guided me to focus on the very split-second when the officer used fatal force.”). On 
a 5-pont scale, participants rated their level of agreement/disagreement (1 = Strongly agree, 5 = 
Strongly disagree). To avoid an acquiescence response bias, lower scores indicated higher 
agreement with each of the statements.   
 Suspicion item (Appendix L). Due to the notoriety of the original case, a suspicion item 
allowed for the identification and exclusion of any participants who might have understood the 
manipulation or been familiar with the actual case.  
Demographics  
Demographics (Appendix M). To measure age, participants entered a number 
expressing their age in years. To measure gender, participants responded to the following 
options: Male, Female, Other. To measure race, participants responded to the following options: 
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, African American, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific Islander, White, or Other. One item measured political orientation from 1 
(extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Living environment was measured by having 
participants respond to the following options: Urban, Suburban, or Rural. One yes/no item asked 
participants if they had interacted with an on-duty police officer in the last 12 months.   
 Confirmatory factor analysis. I used Mplus software (Muthen & Muthen, 1998) to 
conduct confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to evaluate the overall fit of my model to the data. 
The items measuring importance of defense evidence were dropped due to poor model fit, the 
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final scale was created based on the items that more directly assessed the conceptual variable of 
interest: importance assigned to incriminating prosecution evidence. The CFA results indicated 
that my model adequately fit the data (χ² (72, N = 539) = 498.07, p < .001; root mean square 
error approximation (RMSEA) = .048(.043, .054); comparative fit index (CFI)  = .961; (non-
normed fit indexes [NNFI]; Tucker–Lewis index [TLI]) = .953; standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR) = .030). All factor loadings on each latent construct (positive attitudes toward 
police, the importance of prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking) exceeded the 
recommended factor loadings of .400 (e.g., Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Black, 2010). Hence, the 
scales employed to measure the constructs were deemed appropriate for use. See Figure 3 for the 
fully standardized estimates from the CFA model.  
Procedure 
After completing consent and eligibility, participants read general instructions informing 
them they would play the role of mock jurors, read a presentation of the evidence, and render a 
verdict decision. Participants then read standard pre-trial instructions (e.g., charges, jurors’ duty, 
etc.), including the experimental manipulation: Some participants were randomly assigned to 
read totality of circumstance instructions, others to read superseding moment instructions, and 
others to a control condition with no police-specific language. Next, participants viewed a 
presentation of the trial summary. After reading the trial summary, participants read post-trial 
jury instructions, indicated their verdict decisions (guilty/not-guilty), and indicated the degree to 
which they found the defendant guilty (Definitely not guilty-Definitely guilty). After verdicts, 
participants rated the importance of prosecution evidence and the degree to which they viewed 
the incident from the officer’s perspective.  
To avoid order effects, the measure of positive attitudes toward police was 
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counterbalanced with the trial stimulus and dependent variables: Half of participants completed 
the attitudes measure prior to reading the pre-trial instructions, the other half after providing 
verdict decisions and completing the other outcome variables. Participants then completed 
attention and manipulation checks. To determine if the instructions had the hypothesized effect, 
participants completed four conceptual manipulation check items. Finally, participants reported 






 Six participants had missing data: three participants did not answer either manipulation 
check item; four participants did not answer the conceptual manipulation check items; four 
participants did not provide their age; and five participants did not provide their political 
orientation. Participants who did not provide their age or political orientation were included in 
each analysis for which they provided data. Given that no significant differences were found 
between analyses conducted with and without the four participants who did not answer the 
conceptual and manipulation check items, they were not excluded from analysis. Furthermore, 
on the suspicion item, one participant reported familiarity with the original case on which the 
study was based. However, removal of this participant did not significantly alter any findings and 
the datum were not excluded. The cutoff value for significance in all preliminary analyses and 
primary hypothesis testing was p < .05. 
 The effect of instruction content on dependent variables and mediators. Chi-squared 
analysis revealed no significant differences in the likelihood of guilty verdicts across 
experimental conditions (χ² (N = 539) = 2.35, p = .308). Furthermore, analysis of variance testing 
revealed that the experimental effect of instruction content did not significantly influence juror’s 
ratings of officer guilt (F = .01, p = .992), the importance of prosecution evidence (F = .56, p = 
.570), or perspective-taking (F = .16, p = .849).  
The relationship of demographic and control variables with verdicts and case 
judgments. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Guilt was measured as a continuous 
variable and was averaged, with higher scores indicating higher confidence in guilt. Gender was 
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coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women. Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged. 
Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the reference group. 
Political orientation was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged, with higher scores 
indicating more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and 
averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was 
dummy coded with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent 
interactions with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of 
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and 
averaged with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.  
Spearman rank correlation analysis showed age to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict (r = -.117, p = .007), meaning that younger individuals 
were more likely to render guilty verdicts. Race was significantly associated with guilty verdicts: 
82.0% of Black jurors convicted the officer, followed by 57.1% of Hispanic jurors, and 55.8% of 
White jurors, χ² (N = 539) = 16.39, p = .006. Living environment was also predictive of guilty 
verdicts: Jurors who lived in urban areas rendered the highest rates of conviction (68.0%), 
followed by jurors who lived in suburban (56.7%) and rural (53.4%) areas, χ² (N = 539) = 8.27, p 
= .016. Political orientation was significantly associated with the likelihood of convicting the 
officer: the more conservative the juror, the less likely they were to convict, r = -.235, p < .001. 
Gender, level of education, and recent interactions with police were not significantly associated 
with verdicts (all p’s > .05).  
The relationship of demographic and control variables with positive attitudes 
toward police.  Pearson product moment correlation analyses revealed a significant relationship 
between positive attitudes toward police and age (r = .271, p = .001). Specifically, younger 
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(versus older) individuals reported more negative attitudes toward police. One-way analysis of 
variance revealed a significant relationship between juror race and positive attitudes toward 
police (F = 5.61, p < .001). Post-hoc Tukey testing showed that Black jurors (M = 2.89, SD = 
.90) had more negative attitudes toward police than White jurors (M = 3.55, SD = .89). One-way 
ANOVA testing showed living environment to be predictive of positive attitudes toward police 
(F = 4.22, p < .015). Post-hoc Tukey HSD testing revealed that people in urban living 
environments (M = 3.33, SD =.89) had more negative attitudes toward police than those living in 
rural environments (M = 3.66, SD = .88). No other comparisons were significant. Political 
ideology shared a significant relationship with positive attitudes toward police: conservative 
jurors endorsed more positive police attitudes than liberal jurors, r = .169, p < .001. Gender, 
level of education, and recent interactions with police were not significantly related to the focal 
predictor variable (all p’s > .05).  
The effect of counterbalancing order of attitudes and trial stimulus. First, I tested 
whether the trial stimulus could have influenced jurors’ responses on the attitudes scale. Jurors 
who completed the pre-trial attitude measure had more positive attitudes toward police (M = 
3.59, SD = .85) than jurors who completed the post-trial attitude measure (M = 3.35, SD = .93), 
t(537) = 3.03, p = .002, d = .26. This was unsurprising, given that people report more negative 
views of police after learning of police misconduct (e.g., media attention to police misconduct; 
Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015). 
Possible order effects of positive attitudes toward police on dependent measures of 
interest were tested with four independent samples t-tests. Pre-trial versus post-trial 
administration of the attitude measure did not result in any significant differences in the 
likelihood of guilt (p = .788) or the importance of prosecution evidence (p = .952). However, the 
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comparison revealed significant differences in ratings of perspective-taking, t(537) = -2.23, p = 
.026, d = .193. Jurors who completed the pre-trial attitude measure reported higher levels of 
perspective-taking behavior (M = 2.05, SD = 1.08) than jurors who completed the post-trial 
attitude measure (M = 2.27, SD = 1.19). This finding is consistent with prior evidence showing 
that perspective-taking influences attitudes (Aberson & Haag, 2007). Pre- and post-trial 
administration of the attitude measure was named counterbalancing, coded as 0 (pre-trial) and 1 
(post-trial), and was accounted for as a covariate in all subsequent analyses. 
Correlations among focal and outcome variables. Participants’ positive attitudes 
toward police were negatively associated with the likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict (r = -
.257, p < .001), meaning that more negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted 
guilty verdicts. Additionally, jurors’ negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted 
the importance of prosecution evidence (r = -.285, p < .001). Perspective-taking was positively 
associated with positive attitudes toward police (r = .306, p < .001), suggesting that jurors with 
positive (versus negative) attitudes were more likely to engage in perspective-taking. The 
importance of prosecution evidence was predictive of perceived degree of guilt (r = .626, p < 
.001), meaning that the importance of prosecution (versus defense) evidence was associated with 
higher guilt ratings. Perspective-taking was also predictive of perceived degree of guilt (r = -
.168, p = .001), with higher levels of perspective-taking predicting less perceived guilt. See 
Table 3 for all coefficients. 
Conceptual manipulation check. Four One-way ANOVAs tested whether the 
superseding moment or totality of circumstance jury instructions had the theorized effect on 
jurors across each condition (i.e., that superseding moment instructions would lead jurors to rely 
on their own attitudes and to focus on the split-second in which the shooting occurred, while 
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totality of circumstance instructions would lead jurors to rely on objective standards and to focus 
on all facts and circumstances before and after the shooting). The effect of experimental 
condition on jurors’ perceptions that the jury instructions encouraged them to rely on their own 
attitudes was significant, F(2, 532) = 3.35, p = .036, 𝜂2 = .01. Post-hoc Tukey HSD testing 
revealed that jurors in the totality of circumstance condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.30) felt less 
encouraged to rely on their own attitudes compared to jurors in the control condition (M = 3.40, 
SD = 1.47, d = .26), but jurors in the superseding moment condition (M = 3.68, SD = 1.38) did 
not differ from either the control (d = .20) or totality of circumstance (d = .06) conditions.  
The effect of instruction content was also significant on jurors’ perceptions that the jury 
instructions encouraged them to rely on objective standards, F(2,532) = 4.19, p = .016, , 𝜂2 = 
.02. Post-hoc testing revealed that jurors in the totality of circumstance condition (M = 1.58, SD 
= .77) reported that the instructions encouraged them to rely on objective standards more often 
than participants in the control (M = 1.86, SD = 1.10, d = .29), or superseding moment (M = 1.84, 
SD = 1.10, d = .27) conditions. Participants in the superseding moment and control conditions 
did not differ from each other (d = .02). 
Next, instruction content significantly influenced jurors’ reports of whether the 
instructions encouraged them to focus on the split second before the officer used fatal force F(2, 
532) = 39.93, p < .001, , 𝜂2 = .13). Post-hoc testing showed that participants in the superseding 
moment condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.24) were more likely to report that the instructions 
encouraged them to focus on the split-second the officer used force than were participants in the 
control (M = 3.35, SD = 1.41, d = .79) or totality of circumstance (M = 3.38, SD 1.18, d = .81) 
conditions, neither of which differed from each other (d = .02).   
Finally, the effect of experimental condition also significantly influenced jurors’ reports 
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of whether the jury instructions guided them to focus on all facts and circumstances before and 
after the shooting, F(2, 532) = 9.45, p < .001 , 𝜂2 = .04. According to post-hoc testing, jurors in 
the superseding moment condition (M = 2.08, SD = 1.14) were less likely to report that the 
instructions guided them to focus on all of the facts and circumstances than were participants in 
the control (M = 1.78, SD = .99, d = .28) or totality of circumstance (M = 1.62, SD = .84, d = .46) 
conditions, which did not differ from each other (d = .17).  
Primary Hypothesis Testing  
The main effects of attitudes and instructions on dichotomous verdicts. Hierarchical 
logistic regression analyses tested whether the content of jury instructions and positive attitudes 
toward police explained a significant amount of variance in juror’s perceptions of officer guilt 
after controlling for age, gender, race, education, political ideology, living environment, recent 
interactions with police officers, and counterbalancing (H1; Figure 1). The current study met the 
major assumption of logistic regression: the dependent variable (verdict) was dichotomous, there 
was no multicollinearity among the independent variables, there were no outliers, and there was 
not a linear relationship between the odds ratio and the independent variable.  
The continuous moderator (positive attitudes toward police) was centered at the mean. 
Instruction content was dummy coded with the control group serving as the initial reference 
group. Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the initial reference 
group. Living environment was dummy coded with participants from suburban environments 
serving as the initial reference group. After demographic variables and counterbalancing were 
entered as controls at Step 1, Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of 
positive attitudes toward police and jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment and totality of 
circumstance) on the likelihood of conviction. The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., 
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superseding moment X attitudes and totality of circumstance X attitudes) in order to determine 
whether the relationship between positive attitudes toward police and guilty verdicts was 
moderated by the content of jury instructions. See Table 3 for all coefficients. 
The Step 1 model was significant, χ2(9) = 47.66, p < .00, Nagelkerke R² = .12. 
Specifically, there was a main effect of race (B = 1.02, Wald, 6.66, OR = 2.78, p = .010) such 
that Black participants were more likely to convict the officer than White participants. There 
were no differences in guilty verdicts between White and Hispanic participants. There was also a 
main effect of political orientation (B = -.27, Wald = 22.81, OR = .78, p < .001). The more liberal 
the juror, the more likely they were to convict the officer. Counterbalancing and other control 
variables had no significant effect. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of positive 
attitudes toward police at Step 2, B = -0.43, Wald = 12.08, OR = 0.65, p = .001, such that 
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted guilty verdicts. The main effects of 
superseding moment and totality of circumstance compared to control instructions were not 
significant at Step 2 (p > .05). Adding the interaction terms at Step 3 did not increase the amount 
of variance explained (p > .05). See Table 3 for all coefficients. See Figure 3 for a line graph. 
A similar logistic regression analysis compared the totality of circumstance condition 
with the superseding moment condition by using the superseding moment group as the reference 
group. After demographic variables and counterbalancing were entered as controls at Step 1, 
Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive attitudes toward police 
and jury instructions (i.e., control and totality of circumstance) on the likelihood of conviction. 
The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., control X attitudes and totality of circumstance 
X attitudes). The main effect of totality of circumstance versus superseding moment instructions 




The main effects of attitudes and instructions on continuous guilt ratings. 
Hierarchical linear regression analyses tested whether the content of jury instructions explained a 
significant amount of variance in juror’s ratings of officer guilt. All assumptions for analysis 
were met. First, the assumption of no multicollinearity was met, as no VIF values were greater 
than 5.0 and no Tolerance values were below 0.10. Next, the assumption of no autocorrelation of 
residuals was met, as Durbin-Watson results fell within the expected range. Finally, the 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were also met, as the scatterplot of standardized 
residuals on standardized predicted values did not funnel out or curve. Positive attitudes toward 
police were mean centered. Counterbalancing and all demographic variables were entered as 
controls at Step 1. Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive 
attitudes toward police and jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment and totality of 
circumstance) on continuous guilt ratings. The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., 
superseding moment X attitudes and totality of circumstance X attitudes) in order to determine 
whether the relationship between positive attitudes toward police and guilt ratings was 
moderated by the content of jury instructions. 
The Step 1 model was significant, F(4, 429) = 5.97, p < .00, R² = .10, indicating that 
demographic variables accounted for significant amounts of variance in ratings of guilt. 
Specifically, there was a main effect of participant race, B = 1.03, p = .001, 95% CI = [.43, 1.63], 
such that Black participants were more likely than White participants to find the officer guilty. 
There was also a main effect of political orientation, B = -.28, p < .001, 95% CI = -.38, -.18]. The 
more liberal the juror, the more certain they were of the officer’s guilt. Adding the predictor and 
moderator at Step 2 accounted for additional variance in guilt ratings, F = 8.84, p < .001, Δ R² = 
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.07. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of positive attitudes toward police at Step 2, 
B = -.67, p <. .001, 95% CI = [-.88, -.48], such that such that positive (versus negative) attitudes 
toward police predicted lower confidence in guilty verdicts. The effect of instruction content was 
not significant: superseding moment, B = .02, p = .905, 95% CI = [-.38, .42], and totality of 
circumstance, B = .03, p = .874, 95% CI = [-.37, .43], instructions were not significantly 
different from the control condition. Adding the interaction terms did not improve the model. See 
Table 3 for all coefficients. See Table 5 for all coefficients.  
A similar linear regression analysis compared the totality of circumstance condition with 
the superseding moment condition by using the superseding moment group as the reference 
group. After counterbalancing and demographic variables were entered as controls at Step 1, 
Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive attitudes toward police 
and jury instructions (i.e., control and totality of circumstance) on continuous guilt ratings. The 
interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., control X attitudes and totality of circumstance X 
attitudes). The main effect of totality of circumstance versus superseding moment instructions 
was not significant at Step 2, B = .01, p = .970, 95% CI = [-.40, .42], and there were no 
significant interactions (all p’s < .05). See Table 6 for all coefficients.  
Moderated Mediation Analyses 
Version 3.4 of Hayes’s Process Macro (Hayes, 2017) tested whether the effect of 
attitudes on dichotomous verdicts was mediated the importance of prosecution evidence or 
perspective-taking behavior—and whether those relationships were moderated by instruction 
type. The model relies on OLS regression in estimating coefficients in log-odds metric but 
allows for dichotomous outcomes. Model 8 tested the moderated mediation hypotheses that the 
importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking mediated the relationship between 
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positive attitudes toward police and verdicts, with a-paths being moderated by instruction type 
(H2; Figure 2.). Specifically, I tested if there was a direct effect of positive attitudes toward 
police (X) on perceived degree of guilt (Y), and whether there was an indirect effect of positive 
attitudes toward police on perceived degree of guilt through the importance of prosecution 
evidence (M1) and perspective-taking (M2). Hayes PROCESS macro Model 8 accommodates 
multiple mediators acting in parallel, as well as multi-categorical moderator variables. Positive 
attitudes toward police, the importance of prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were 
mean-centered. Counterbalancing and demographic variables were controlled as covariates and 
predicted attitudes toward police, importance of prosecution evidence, perspective-taking, and 
guilty verdicts. The number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap intervals was 5000. 
The dummy variables for totality of circumstance and superseding moment instructions were 
included in the model, with the control instructions serving as the initial reference group. The 
same process was then repeated with the superseding instructions serving as the reference group.  
Positive attitudes toward police significantly predicted the importance of prosecution 
evidence, B = -.27, p = .005, 95% CI = [-.46, -.09]. Specifically, jurors with more positive 
(versus more negative) attitudes toward police tended to attribute less importance to prosecution 
evidence. As predicted, positive attitudes toward police also significantly predicted perspective-
taking, B = .42, p = .001, 95% CI = [.20, .65]. Jurors with more positive (versus negative) 
attitudes toward the police reported higher levels of perspective-taking. In turn, attributions of 
importance to prosecution evidence significantly predicted verdict outcomes, B= 1.96, p < .001, 
95% CI = [ 1.55, 2.38]. Jurors who attributed more importance to prosecution evidence were 
more likely to render guilty verdicts. Perspective-taking was also a significant predictor of 
verdicts, B = -.39, p = .008, 95% CI = [-.69, -.10] indicating that jurors who reported higher 
47 
 
levels of perspective-taking were less likely to convict the officer. Instruction content did not 
significantly moderate the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence or on 
perspective-taking and there were no significant interactions. The conditional indirect effect of 
attitudes on verdicts through the importance of prosecution evidence was significant in the 
control (95% CI = [-.97, -.18]) and totality (95% CI = [-.92, -.10]) conditions, but was not 
significant in the superseding moment (95% CI = [-.66, .05]) condition. The index of moderated 
mediation was not significant, 95% CI = [-.23, .76]. The conditional indirect effect through 
perspective-taking was significant in the control (95% CI = [-.50, -.01]) and superseding moment 
(95% CI = [-.38, -.00]) conditions, but was not significant in the totality of circumstance (95% 
CI = [-.08, .01]) condition. The index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% CI – [-
.25, .03]). 
Participants with higher levels of education attributed less importance to prosecution 
evidence, B = -.13, p = .013, 95% CI [-.22, -.04], and engaged in less perspective-taking, B = 
.13, p = .021, 95% CI = [.02, .23]. More conservative (versus more liberal) jurors attributed more 
importance to prosecution evidence B = -.07, p = .003, 95% CI = [-.12, -.03]. No other control 
variables were significantly related to focal variables. 
 Thus, the results indicated that the relationship between jurors’ positive attitudes toward 
police and their verdict choices was mediated through the importance of prosecution evidence, 
and through perspective-taking, but was not influenced by jury instruction content. When 
compared to the control condition, neither superseding moment nor totality of circumstance 
instructions significantly moderated the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution 
evidence or perspective-taking. Figure 4 is a path diagram depicting the results of the moderated 
mediation model (Hayes, 2012) with the control group serving as the reference. 
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To test any significant differences between the superseding moment and totality of 
circumstance conditions, the same analysis was repeated with the superseding moment condition 
serving as the reference group. The pattern of results was similar to that seen in the first model. 
Positive attitudes toward police predicted the importance of prosecution evidence (B = -.19, p = 
.024, 95% CI = [-.33, -.02]) and perspective-taking (B = .33, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.51, -.16]). In 
turn, the importance of prosecution evidence (B = 1.96, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.55, 2.38]) and 
perspective-taking (B = .-.39, p = .008, 95% CI [-.69, -.10] both predicted verdict outcomes. 
Instruction content did not significantly moderate the effect of attitudes on the importance of 
prosecution evidence or on perspective-taking and there were no significant interactions. The 
conditional indirect effect of attitudes through the importance of prosecution evidence was 
significant across the control (95% CI = [-.99, -.16]), superseding moment (95% CI = [-.66, -
.04]), and totality of circumstance (95% CI = [-.92, -.11]) conditions. The index of moderated 
mediation was not significant when comparing the superseding moment to the totality of 
circumstance (95% CI = [-.69, .29]) or control (95% CI = [-.77, .26] conditions. Figure 5 is a 
path diagram depicting the results of the moderated mediation model (Hayes, 2012) with the 
superseding moment group serving as the reference. Overall, moderated mediation analysis 
showed that the relationship between jurors’ positive attitudes toward police and their verdicts 
was mediated through the importance of prosecution evidence and through perspective-taking, 






As expected, juror’s attitudes toward the police were predictive of their verdicts. Jurors 
with negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police were more likely to convict the officer. 
Across three experimental conditions in a mock fatal police use of force trial, I manipulated the 
content of jury instructions to be consistent with totality of circumstance language (Tennessee v. 
Garner, 1985), superseding moment language (Graham v. Connor, 1989), or a control condition 
with no police-specific language. Testing the mediating effects of the importance of  prosecution 
evidence and the extent to which they engaged in perspective-taking further contextualized the 
effects of jurors existing attitudes toward police on their verdict decisions. Specifically, jurors’ 
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted the importance of prosecution 
evidence and, in turn, the importance of prosecution evidence influenced verdict outcomes. 
Additionally, positive attitudes toward police predicted perspective-taking and perspective-
taking predicted verdict outcomes. Jurors who reported higher levels of perspective-taking were 
less likely to convict the officer. The content of jury instructions did not successfully moderate 
the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence or perspective-taking. In other 
words, the relationship between jurors’ attitudes toward police and their verdicts was mediated 
through the importance of prosecution evidence and through perspective-taking, but was not 
influenced by jury instruction content.  
The Relationship between Attitudes and Verdicts 
The present study provided further evidence in support of the powerful effect jurors’ 
attitudes on their legal judgments. Similarly, Carlson and Russo (2001) demonstrated that jurors’ 
pre-trial attitudes toward typical civil defendants predicted verdict preferences. My findings were 
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more specifically in line with evidence from studies investigating the effect of juror’s attitudes 
on their judgments of specific use of force incidents (e.g., Celestin & Kruschke, 2018; Gerber & 
Jackson, 2017; Jefferis, Butcher, & Hanley, 2011; Weitzer, 2002). As expected, jurors with 
positive attitudes toward police were more likely to acquit the police officer of illegal use of fatal 
force and those with negative attitudes toward police were more likely to convict the officer. 
According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), attitudes tend to develop in favor of, or against, 
persons, places, or things, and once formed, they allow individuals to make rapid judgments in 
social situations without expending much cognitive effort. As such, the attitude that a person has 
developed toward police over the course of their life—through their own experiences and 
learning about the experiences of others—come to influence how that person would perceive and 
process information presented to them in a fatal police use of force trial.    
Consistent with public polling data (e.g., Pew Research Center; Fingerhut, 2017), jurors 
in the present study reported generally positive attitudes toward police. However, there were 
several indications that overall attitudes toward police have continued to shift downward among 
some groups of individuals. For example, finding that non-White participants were more likely 
to have somewhat negative attitudes toward the police, and to render more convictions, was not 
surprising in light of the poor relationship between police and communities of color (Wheelock, 
Stroshine, & O’Hear, 2018). Black Americans make up 13% of the total population, yet they 
account for 27% of the total victims of police shootings, and 38% of the unarmed civilians killed 
by police each year (U.S. Census Data, July 2017; Washington Post, 2018). Consequently, Black 
Americans report feeling targeted and abused by law enforcement (Weitzer, Tuch, & Skogan, 
2008) and do not believe police officers are held accountable for faulty judgment in use of force 
cases. Furthermore, verdicts in the present study were consistent with other studies showing that 
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younger (Jefferis, et al., 1997; McLean, Wolfe, & Pratt, 2019), non-White (Weitzer, et al., 2008), 
and/or liberal (Gerber & Jackson, 2017) jurors, and those who live in urban areas (Ekins, 2016), 
are the least likely to have positive attitudes toward police. These findings are consistent with 
research investigating how strongly held public or peer attitudes about police shootings can lead 
to stronger individual attitudes (i.e., the “bandwagon effect,” Huff, Alvarez, & Miller, 2018).  
Jurors in the present study who completed the pre-trial (versus post-trial) attitude measure 
reported more positive attitudes toward police, which is consistent with evidence showing that 
exposure to negative information about social groups leads to more negative attitudes toward 
those groups (e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015),. Specifically, media 
coverage of police shootings has increased over time (McLaughlin, 2015) and, in line with 
present findings, people report more negative views of police following recent exposure to news 
coverage of police misconduct (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015). For 
example, Kochel (2015) demonstrated that negative views of police increased with exposure to 
the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO but, perhaps due to increased fear, 
willingness to cooperate with police also increased overall.  
Although pre-trial versus post-trial administration of the attitude measure did not result in 
any significant differences in the likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict or the importance of 
prosecution evidence, the timing of the attitude measure did influence the extent to which 
participants attempted to view the incident from the officer’s perspective. In line with prior 
evidence showing that perspective-taking influences attitudes (Aberson & Haag, 2007), jurors in 
the present study who completed the pre-trial attitude measure reported higher levels of 
perspective-taking behavior than participants who completed the post-trial attitude measure. 
Superseding moment instructions encouraged jurors to consider the officer’s subjective 
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experience in the moment force was used (e.g., “the standard of reasonableness at the moment 
applies…police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments…”). According to 
cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), inducing such a subjective standard of 
reasonableness should have led jurors in the superseding moment condition to more heavily 
consider defense (versus prosecution) evidence and, in turn, to acquit the officer. However, this 
hypothesis was not supported by the evidence. Although juror’s perceptions of officer guilt were 
technically trending in the predicted direction, the effect of attitudes toward police on guilty 
verdicts in the superseding moment condition was essentially indistinguishable from the control 
condition.  
The Effect of Instruction Content on Verdicts  
My hypothesis that juror’s verdicts would be influenced by the content of jury 
instructions was not supported by the findings. Thus, the findings are inconsistent with prior 
evidence that guiding or instructing participants to think in specific ways can affect behavioral 
outcomes (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Bargh et al., 
2001; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). Specifically, when the totality of circumstance instructions 
guided jurors to consider a list of specific factors (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent 
persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if suspect not 
apprehended, warning given when feasible), jurors were expected to be more likely to convict 
the officer than jurors in the superseding moment or control conditions, but that was not the case. 
Information processing. Although evidence has shown that jurors take jury instructions 
seriously and work hard to understand them, they often fall short (Ellsworth, 1989). Jurors 
frequently misunderstand the instructions given to them and fail to grasp how the instructions 
relate to fundamental principles in the justice system (Ellsworth, 2003; Saxton, 1989). Indeed, 
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evidence has shown that jurors understand less than half of the instructions they receive 
(Reifman, et al., 1992). Serious consequences can follow when jurors fail to comprehend the 
legal instructions they are given. For example, evidence has shown that jurors who experienced 
substantial confusion over jury instructions were more willing to impose the death penalty than 
jurors who had a better understanding of the instructions (Weiner, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995). 
However, when jurors are reminded of the importance of careful analysis, they will put forth the 
effort (Bornstein & Greene, 2011). Although jurors in the present study seemed to grasp the 
content of the instructions, their understanding of the content did not significantly influence their 
decision-making.   
In the present study, jurors demonstrated sensitivity to the content of the jury instructions 
by correctly identifying the guidance they had received. Specifically, jurors in the totality of 
circumstance condition reported feeling less encouraged to rely on their own attitudes than did 
participants in the control and superseding moment conditions. Furthermore, jurors in the totality 
of circumstance condition reported that the instructions encouraged them to rely on objective 
standards more often than participants in the control or superseding moment conditions. 
However, totality of circumstance instructions did not significantly influence verdicts directly 
and did not influence the relationship between attitudes and verdict decisions. 
Participants in the superseding moment condition were more likely than participants in 
the control or totality of circumstance conditions to report that the instructions encouraged them 
to focus on the split-second the officer used force. Additionally, jurors in the superseding 
moment condition were less likely to report that the instructions guided them to focus on all the 
facts and circumstances than were participants in the control or totality of circumstance 
conditions. Despite juror’s sensitivity to the content of superseding moment instructions, jurors’ 
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grasp of the overall guidance they received from the instructions did not directly or indirectly 
influence their verdict decisions. 
The Mediating Effect of the Importance of Prosecution Evidence 
Jurors’ attitudes toward police influenced their perceptions of the evidence presented to 
them during a mock criminal trial of a police officer defendant charged with first-degree murder 
for unlawful use of fatal force. Hence, my findings provided further support for the tenets of 
cognitive consistency theory (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004) and extend prior 
research demonstrating that people’s decision-making is distorted by their existing knowledge 
and beliefs (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004; Russo, Carlson, Meloy, 
2008). Specifically, attitudes toward police officers had a substantial influence on the way jurors 
perceived and interpreted the importance of evidence presented to them during a trial of a police 
officer. Consistent with theoretical expectations, jurors in the present study with more negative 
(versus positive) attitudes toward police tended to place higher value on prosecution evidence. In 
turn, placing greater importance on prosecution evidence was associated with a higher likelihood 
of rendering a guilty verdict. According to theory, this is because a person’s social attitude 
influences how they process new information related to that attitude, and prepares them to 
perceive events that are consistent with their beliefs (Roskos-Ewoldwon & Fazio, 1992; Fazio, et 
al., 1994). 
The Mediating Effect of Perspective-Taking  
As predicted, the effect of jurors’ positive attitudes toward police on their verdicts was 
mediated through perspective-taking behavior. Prior evidence has shown that perspective-taking 
increases empathy for defendants and decreases conviction rates (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; 
Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014). Because superseding moment 
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instructions explicitly encouraged jurors to engage in perspective-taking (e.g., “…must be judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer…forced to make split-second judgments…”), jurors 
in the superseding moment (versus control or totality) condition were expected to feel increased 
empathy for the officer and, in turn, to acquit the officer at higher rates. However, this was not 
the observed pattern of results.  
The superseding moment instructions had no significant effect on the extent to which 
jurors engaged in perspective-taking. Although juror’s attitudes toward police influenced the 
extent to which jurors reported engaging in perspective-taking, the effect was in the opposite 
direction of that predicted. Specifically, people with negative (versus positive) attitudes toward 
police were less likely to engage in perspective-taking, and, in turn, more likely to convict the 
officer. Thus, the present findings contribute to the study of perspective-taking behavior by 
demonstrating that individual’s relevant attitudes influence the extent to which they engage in 
perspective-taking behavior, which, in turn, comes to influence decision-making processes.  
The Overall Moderated Mediation Model 
As anticipated, results of the overall model revealed that jurors’ positive attitudes toward 
police predicted the importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking behavior, in turn, 
these mediators predicted verdict outcomes. Specifically, negative attitudes toward police 
predicted the importance of prosecution evidence and, in turn, the importance of prosecution 
evidence predicted guilty verdicts. Similarly, negative attitudes toward police predicted low 
levels of perspective-taking and, in turn, higher convict rates. In contrast to my prediction, there 
were no direct effects of instruction content, instruction content did not significantly moderate 
the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence, or on perspective-taking, and 




Psychological Implications  
Results from the present study have important implications for the psychological study of 
jury decision-making. Importantly, my findings suggested that jurors’ attitudes toward police are 
likely to influence verdicts in fatal police use of force trials. In support of the story model of jury 
decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and cognitive consistency theory (Holyoak & 
Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004), jurors’ verdicts in this mock trial appear to have been shaped 
by their desire to make decisions that were consistent with their attitudes toward police. 
Research applying cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994) to the study of jury 
decision-making has demonstrated that inducing experiential or rational information processing 
can be accomplished in a multitude of ways across various legal contexts. Thus, the present 
study contributed to the literature on cognitive experiential self-theory by testing whether jury 
instructions in fatal use of force trials moderated the effect of existing attitudes toward police on 
verdict decisions. Contrary to expectations, instruction content did not moderate the effect of 
attitudes on verdicts. Hence, the jury instructions used in fatal police use of force cases do not 
appear to have been effective stimuli for inducing a rational versus experiential mode of 
information processing.  
Practical Implications  
When people perceive police procedures and courtroom adjudications as fair, they have 
increased trust in the justice system (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2007). Yet public 
outrage has grown in response to a perceived lack of accountability for police officers who 
employ fatal use of force (Grinberg, 2018; McLaughlin, 2015; Stinson, 2019). Indeed, as I am in 
the final editing stages of this manuscript, protests and marches against police brutality toward 
Black Americans have erupted all over the world, sparked by the death of George Floyd in 
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Minneapolis, Minnesota. Considering increased public scrutiny of fatal police shooting incidents, 
the number of such trials is likely to increase. The present findings have important implications 
for the criminal justice system as a whole—and specifically for legal actors in fatal police use of 
force cases—as jurors’ attitudes toward police are likely to shape how jurors view the evidence 
presented to them during fatal police use of force trials. Continuing to address procedural 
variations and potential shortcomings in the legal system ensures that justice is distributed evenly 
and without bias. In turn, this sends a message to the community that the legal process is 
representative of the community as a whole and that authorities within the legal system are 
willing to recognize and correct failures when there has been a miscarriage of justice.  
Strengths and Limitations 
The present study took an important first step towards understanding how the specific 
types of jury instructions that are given in fatal police use of force trials may come to influence 
the effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police on their ultimate verdict decisions. Statistical 
conclusion validity was increased by ensuring an adequate sample size (Maxwell, 2004). 
Ecological validity was increased through the use of study materials that were adapted from 
actual trial materials, as well as jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment, totality of 
circumstance, or control), which are used in actual fatal police use of force trials. In practice, 
however, jury instructions sometimes contain a combination of superseding moment language 
and totality of circumstance language or may not contain language from either. However, to test 
other practical effects of interest within a single design, the present study compared only jury 
instructions containing superseding moment instructions with those containing totality of 
circumstance language or control instructions with no police-specific language. Furthermore, 
although the charges presented to jurors were directly quoted from Illinois criminal pattern 
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instructions, they are not fully representative of the inevitable variations found in actual charging 
instructions across different jurisdictions, states, and Circuits in the United States.  
Despite the contributions of this study to advancing understanding of jury decision 
making in fatal police use of force trials, there were several notable limitations. First, a 
community sample of mock-jurors that deliberated in groups would have provided several 
advantages over the online sample of individual participants in the present study. Although many 
studies have demonstrated that individual, pre-deliberation verdicts are reliable predictors of 
final group verdicts (Kalven & Zeisel, 1972; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995), several studies have 
shown that deliberation has a powerful impact on trial outcomes. For example, studies have 
shown deliberation leads to discussion of more case facts (Ellsworth, 1989), fewer guilty verdicts 
(i.e., leniency bias; Kerr & MacCoun, 2012), and can reduce the effect of attitudes on verdicts in 
morally ambiguous cases (i.e., euthanasia; Meissner et al., 2003). Furthermore, deliberating vs 
non-deliberating jurors are less likely to be influenced by pre-trial publicity (Ruva & McEvoy, 
2008; Ruva & Guenther, 2015) and are better able to disregard inadmissible evidence (Kerwin & 
Shaffer, 1994). Moreover, deliberation increases jurors’ understanding of, and compliance with, 
jury instructions (Ellsworth, 1989). For instance, Devine et al., (2001) found that deliberating 
(versus non-deliberating) jurors demonstrated 17% stronger comprehension of standard 
instructions and 38% stronger comprehension of simplified instructions.  
A representative community sample would also have been more ecologically valid than 
the online sample of participants employed in the present study. Although some evidence has 
suggested that MTurk participants are no more likely to engage in problematic behaviors (e.g., 
complete the same study multiple times, provide misleading information) than participants from 
campus or community samples (Necka, Cacioppo, Norman, & Cacioppo, 2016), other evidence 
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suggests otherwise (Wessling, Huber, & Netzer, 2017). For example, Wessler and colleagues 
found that a substantial proportion of MTurk workers misrepresented their character and identity 
to qualify for a study. Furthermore, given that MTurk workers are unsupervised and financially 
motivated to complete the study as quickly as possible, evidence suggests they may put forth 
insufficient effort (see Ford for a review, 2017).    
Additionally, requiring participants to deliberate with other jurors would have 
strengthened the situational pressure to disregard any personal preferences and render verdicts 
that were more consistent with the evidence and legal guidelines. According to situational 
strength literature, deliberating jurors face more situational pressure to ignore the influence of 
their own individual differences, which reduces the strength of the relationship between 
individual personality differences and actual behavior (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Hence, additional 
steps could have been taken to increase the situational strength when jurors rendered their 
verdicts. Specifically, the experimental design could have incorporated a virtual group 
deliberation via anonymous chatrooms. Indeed, mock-jury studies in which groups of jurors 
anonymously attended secure chat rooms and shared written responses with each other until they 
reached a decision have produced similar benefits to actual jury deliberations (Tabak, Klettke, & 
Knight, 2013). In support, Kuhn, Weinstock, and Flaton (1994) compared jurors who a.) 
answered reasoning questions after the trial, b.) answered reasoning questions after deliberating 
with others, or c.) answered reasoning questions after ruminating about the details of the trial, 
and found that jurors in the deliberation group demonstrated higher reasoning skills than 
participants in the other groups. Thus, it is possible that the use of individual verdict decisions 
underestimated participant’s reasoning skills.  
Furthermore, six participants failed to complete all the demographic and control 
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measures. Specifically, four of those participants did not provide their age and five did not 
provide their political orientation. This highlights a limitation in the present study, as age and 
political orientation were strongly associated with attitudes toward police and verdicts. Younger 
(versus older) and more liberal (versus more conservative) jurors reported more negative 
attitudes toward police and rendered guilty verdicts more often. Although the absence of data 
from these participants did not substantially alter any of the present findings, it is unknown what 
type of impact the presence of that information may have had. Lastly, other theoretical 
explanations and measures may offer better insights and predictions than those currently 
employed. 
Future Directions 
The next step would be to replicate the present study with a community sample of mock-
jurors who deliberated in groups. Current evidence of juror’s reactions to specific police use of 
force incidents remains somewhat sparse in the literature, but notable studies have examined the 
effects of political ideology (Gerber & Jackson, 2017), victim race (Huff, et al., 2018), 
eyewitness race (Saulnier, Burke, & Bottoms, 2019), justifiability of force (Huff, et al., 2018), 
severity of the victim’s action relative to the officer’s reaction (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019), and 
the effects of body-worn camera footage (Saulnier & Burke, 2019) on juror’s judgments. 
Investigating whether jury instructions might strengthen or diminish the effect of attitudes on 
juror’s judgments across such topics would serve the development of jury decision-making 
theories and would also increase ecological validity.  
Finally, it is possible that verdict outcomes would have been different if jurors had been 
given additional, or different, charging options from first-degree murder. My findings were 
inconsistent with prior evidence that providing jurors with only “severe” punishment options 
lowered convictions (Kerr, 1978). Evidence has also shown that when “moderate” penalty 
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options are available, convictions increase (Vidmar, 1972), with the inclusion of manslaughter 
decreasing both guilty and not-guilty verdicts (Smithson, Deady, & Gracik, 2007). Further 
research is needed to address and resolve theoretical discrepancies related to the effects of 







The present findings increased our understanding of the influence of jurors’ attitudes on 
their decision-making process during fatal police use of force trials. Specifically, jurors’ attitudes 
toward police shaped their evaluations of the prosecution evidence and the extent to which they 
engaged in perspective-taking behavior during a fatal police use of force trial. Jurors’ with 
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police attributed greater importance to prosecution 
evidence, which, in turn, lead jurors to convict the officer more often. Additionally, negative 
(versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted low levels of perspective-taking, and, in turn, 
low levels of perspective-taking predicted higher rates of conviction. Finally, the content of jury 







Figure 1. Line graph depicting the predicted interaction effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police, 




















The Effect of Instruction Content and Attitudes 













Figure 3. Fully Standardized CFA Estimates. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; RMSEA = 
root mean square error approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit 







Figure 4. Line graph depicting the effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police, and the content of 
jury instructions, on guilty verdicts in a fatal police use of force trial.  
Note. Results from all conditions are depicted. Verdicts in the Control and Superseding Moment 


































Figure 5. Path diagram depicting the results of a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2017) 






Figure 6. Path diagram depicting the results of a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2017) 






Overall Sample Demographics (N = 539)  
 
Variable N % M SD 
Age 535  43.13 13.96 
Gender 535    
   Male  43.9   
   Female  55.9   
  Other  0.2   
Education 535    
   No High School Degree  0.7   
   High School/GED  11.6   
   Some College  29.5   
   Graduate/Prof. Degree  44.3   
Political Ideology 534    
   Liberal  48.8   
   Moderate  16.4   
   Conservative  34.9   
Living Environment 535    
   Urban  25.6   
   Suburban  52.3   
   Rural  22.1   
Police Interactions 535    
   Yes  33.6   





Means for Continuous Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator Across 
Experimental Conditions (N = 539) 
 
  Overall 
(N = 539) 
Control 
(N = 192) 
Superseding 
(N = 173) 
Totality 
(N = 174) 
Measure Range M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Degree of Guilt 1-7 4.46 2.07 4.46 2.08 4.48 2.12 4.45 2.03 
Prosecution Evidence 1-5 3.70 .96 3.74 1.04 3.73 .93 3.64 .94 
Perspective-Taking 1-7 5.98 1.17 5.97 1.21 6.0 1.15 5.91 1.14 
Attitudes  1-7 3.47 .90 3.45 .90 3.45 .94 3.50 .85 
Notes. Degree of guilt was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = Definitely not guilty, 7 = Definitely 
guilty). The importance of prosecution evidence was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = Extremely 
important, 5 = Not at all important). Prosecution items were recoded such that lower scores 
indicated the importance of prosecution evidence. Perspective-taking was measured on a 7-point 
scale (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree) and was recoded such that higher scores indicated 
higher perspective-taking. Positive attitudes toward police were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree), with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes 














Table 3  
Correlations Among Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator (N = 539)  
 
Notes. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Guilt was measured as a continuous 
variable and was averaged, with higher scores indicating higher confidence in guilt. Gender was 
coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women. Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged. 
Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the reference group. 
Political orientation was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged, with higher scores 
indicating more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and 
averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was 
dummy coded with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent 
interactions with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of 
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and 
averaged with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.  







Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions 
on Dichotomous Verdicts with Control Instructions as Reference Group 
 
 
Notes. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Gender was coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women. 
Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged. Participant race was dummy 
coded with White participants serving as the reference group. Political orientation was measured 
as a continuous variable and was averaged, and then mean-centered with higher scores indicating 
more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and averaged 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was dummy coded 
with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent interactions 
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with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of prosecution 
evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and was averaged, and 
then mean-centered with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.  
Standardized odds ratios (OR) represent OR when standardized attitude scores are used.  





Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions 
on Dichotomous Verdicts with Superseding Moment Instructions as Indicator 
 
 
Notes. Step 1 results and categorical variable coding are the same as reflected in Table 4. 
Standardized odds ratios (OR) represent OR when standardized attitude scores are used.  








Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions 
on Continuous Guilt Ratings with Control Instructions as Indicator 
 
      Model 1              Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1          
     Age -.01 .01 -.07 .00 .01 -.01 .00 .01 .05 
     Male -.07 .17 -.02 -.05 .17 -.01 -.05 .17 -.01 
     Black 1.03** .31 .14 .72* .30 .10 .72* .30 .10 
     Hispanic .03 .45 .00 .02 .44 .00 .03 .44 .00 
     Education -.08 .10 -.03 -.05 .10 -.02 -.05 .10 -.02 
     Political Ideology -.28** .05 -.25 -.17** .05 -.15 -.17** .05 -.15 
     Urban .13 .21 .03 .13 .20 .03 .13 .20 .03 
     Rural .20 .23 .04 .22 .22 .04 .22 .22 .05 
     Recent Interactions .26 .19 .06 .21 .18 .05 .21 .18 -.01 
Counterbalancing -.04 .17 -.01 -.17 .17 -.04 -.17 .17 -.04 
Step 2          
     Attitudes    -.67** .10 -.29 -.64 ** .16 -.28 
     Superseding    .02 .20 .01 .02 .20 .01 
     Totality    .03 .20 .01 .03 .20 .01 
Step 3          
     Attitudes * 
Superseding 
      -.05 .22 -.01 
     Attitudes * Totality       -.06 .23 -.02 
R²  .102   .169   .169  
F for change in R²  6.64   8.84   7.56  
 






Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions 
on Continuous Guilt Ratings with Superseding Moment Instructions as Indicator 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 2       
     Attitudes -.67**   .10 -.30  -.68**  .16 -.30 
     Control -.02   .20 -.01  -.02  .20 -.01 
     Totality  .01   .21  .00   .13  .21  .00 
Step 3       
     Attitudes * Control     .01  .22  .01 
     Attitudes * Totality    -.01  .21  .00 
R²    .169    .169  
F for change in R²  8.84   7.56  
Notes. Coding of categorical variables is the same as Table 4. Step 1 results are the same as 
reflected in Table 6.  
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ELIGIBILITY AND CONSENT 
You are being asked to complete this survey because we are interested in jurors’ decisions 
in criminal trials. Please read this form before agreeing to participate. 
1. The purpose of this research is to investigate opinions about court cases. 
2. If you agree to participate, you were asked to view a presentation of a court case including 
summaries of evidence and testimony and then to complete a questionnaire assessing your 
opinions about the case. 
3. Your participation will take no more than 35 minutes. 
4. The information we collect were used solely for research purposes. The data were collected 
and analyzed by the researchers in aggregate form. Although anonymity cannot be guaranteed, as 
with any academic research, your answers are strictly confidential and the data will not contain 
any information that can be used to uniquely identify you or your individual responses. 
5. All information collected as part of this research were stored on a secure server. We will take 
all reasonable steps to protect your identity and will not even record your name as a participant, 
so there is no way your name will ever be linked to your survey responses. Thus, your answers 
will remain completely confidential and your data were stored in a completely confidential 
manner. 
6. Participation in this study involves the risk of some psychological discomfort. You may view 
evidence from an actual shooting event that resulted in death. However, this would not be more 
upsetting than anything you could see in movies, online, or on the news. Although there are no 
direct benefits to you for participating, the information you provide will help improve our 
understanding of legal reasoning, which advances social psychological research. 
7. Your participation is completely voluntary.  You may withdraw at any time without 
consequence. 
8. By participating in this study, you will have the opportunity to earn credits on Mechanical 
Turk. 
9.       This study is being conducted by Chasity Ratliff at Southern Illinois University. If you 
have questions, you may contact the researchers at (573)270-9381 or chasity.ratliff@siu.edu. 
10. This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.  
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the 
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Compliance, Southern Illinois University, 
Carbondale, IL 62901-4709.  Phone (618) 453-4534.   E-mail siuhsc@siu.edu 
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. By clicking “I  understand 
and wish to continue” below, I indicate that I agree to participate in this research. 
To begin, please answer these questions: 
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Are you 18 years or older? 
o Yes 
o No 
Are you a United States Citizen? 
o Yes 
o No 
*If the participant is younger than 18 or is not a U.S. citizen, they will see the following 
prompt: 
Thank you for your interest in completing this research study. However, participation in this 




APPENDIX B  
ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICE 








Police generally make fair and 
impartial decisions in the cases 
they deal with.  
     
Police give people the 
opportunity to tell their side of 
the story before making any 
decisions.   
     
Police make decisions based 
upon the law and not their 
personal opinions or biases. 
     
When the police deal with 
people they almost always 
behave according to the law.  
     
Police have great respect for 
people’s rights.  
     
Police often arrest people for no 
good reason. 
     
Police stand up for values that 
are important to me.  
     
I generally support how the 
police act in my community.  
     
Police usually act in ways 
consistent with my own ideas 
about what is right and wrong.  
     
Items adapted from Jackson, J., Trinkner, R., & Tyler, T. (2018). Bounded authority: 
expanding appropriate police behavior beyond procedural justice. Law and Human 






Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the three following sets of instructions.   
CONTROL: 
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who 
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer.  The officer is now 
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in 
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the 
evidence presented at trial. 
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please 
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence. 
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function 
in the criminal justice system.  
The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of 
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of 
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the 
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt.  
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those 
facts to the law as it is given to you.  That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not 
Guilty.”  In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the 
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence 
exhibits, and witness testimony. At the end of the trial you will receive additional, detailed 
instructions.  
SUPERSEDING MOMENT:  
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who 
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer.  The officer is now 
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in 
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the 
evidence presented at trial. 
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please 
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence. 
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function 
in the criminal justice system.  
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The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of 
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of 
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the 
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt.  
It is important to understand that police officers are permitted to use lethal force under some 
circumstances. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. 
With respect to a claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.  
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those 
facts to the law as it is given to you.  That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not 
Guilty.”  In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the 
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence 
exhibits, and witness testimony. At the end of the trial you will receive additional, detailed 
instructions.  
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE: 
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who 
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer.  The officer is now 
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in 
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the 
evidence presented at trial. 
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please 
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence. 
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function 
in the criminal justice system.  
The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of 
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of 
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the 
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt. It is important to understand that 
police officers are permitted to use lethal force under some circumstances. The reasonableness of 
a particular use of force depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors 
you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was unreasonable include, 
without limitation:  
The need for the force used;  
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;  
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The extent of the victim’s injury;  
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;  
The severity of the crime at issue;  
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;  
Whether warning was given; 
Whether the victim was actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if 
the victim was attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably 
appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person. 
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those 
facts to the law as it is given to you.  That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not 
Guilty.”  In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the 
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence 







APPENDIX D  
TRIAL STIMULUS 
OPENING STATEMENTS: 
PROSECUTOR: Angela Woods 
On the night in question, February 5, 2018, Officer Joseph Collins and his partner were 
dispatched to investigate a report of a man—later identified as Shawn Davis—who was stealing 
from trucks. Officers located Shawn Davis and approached him, ordering him to stop and take 
his hands out of his pockets. Shawn Davis turned, walked away and took both hands out of his 
pockets, displaying a small knife in his right hand. Joseph Collins drew his weapon and ordered 
Shawn Davis to drop the knife, but Shawn Davis continued walking away. Officer Joseph 
Collins didn’t shoot though, he continued to follow Shawn Davis on foot. Another officer—Stan 
Bogan—followed in the police cruiser while the police dispatcher requested a police unit with a 
Taser.  
Now, to be clear, as Officer Bogan was attempting to use the police cruiser to direct Shawn 
Davis, Davis did strike the windshield and popped the squad car tire with his knife. But, ladies 
and gentlemen, the damage was minimal. The officers on the scene did not feel the need to fire 
their weapons, they already had a plan in place. Like I said, dispatch had already called for a unit 
with a Taser and they were in route. Every officer in this area has access to that radio frequency 
and would have been able to hear this. 
Now, this is when Officers Dale Seabaugh and Mike Smith—the defendant—arrived on the 
scene. Ladies and gentlemen, Mike Smith got out of the vehicle with his gun drawn. Not long 
after, he opened fire 16 times. Smith emptied his magazine while Shawn Davis was surrounded 
by squad cars and while a Taser unit was near. There was also a chain link fence six to seven feet 
tall preventing Shawn Davis from escaping police, and there were no pedestrians nearby. Mike 
Smith abused his power as a police officer that night and committed murder when he shot Shawn 
Davis.  
DEFENSE: Martin Montgomery 
The evidence in this case is going to show that Officer Mike Smith is not a murderer, but a 
reasonable police officer who feared for his life and the life of others while serving in the line of 
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duty that night. Furthermore, the evidence will demonstrate that Officer Smith acted within his 
training when he fired his weapon at what he perceived to be a dangerous suspect coming toward 
him with a deadly weapon.  
Now, I just want to give you a little more context on Shawn Davis and why the police were there 
in the first place. The police received a call that Shawn Davis was stealing from trucks inside a 
secured lot and what the prosecution didn’t tell you is that Shawn Davis had threatened the driver 
who discovered him with a knife. Then, when the officers initially came into contact with Shawn 
Davis, he brandished the same knife—a deadly weapon—at the officers and disobeyed orders to 
drop the knife, causing Officer Collins to draw his weapon.  
As you will see, Shawn Davis continued on his path of destruction when he struck the 
windshield and punctured the tires of a squad car when the police were attempting to confront 
and contain him. Then, as more police units arrived on the scene, Shawn Davis flicked out his 
knife and took off running near busy restaurants full of innocent civilians who would have been 
put at risk.  
Shawn Davis had already brandished his weapon toward police officers and violently damaged a 
police cruiser, so Officer Smith reasonably concluded that Shawn Davis was planning an attack 
at this point in his wild rampage. In the moment he fired his weapon, Smith was reasonably 
afraid based on Shawn Davis’s behavior, and he was focused on a threat to himself, his fellow 
officers, and to innocent civilians. That threat was Shawn Davis. Officer Smith acted in 
accordance with his training and instincts to protect himself and others from the serious threat 
posed by Shawn Davis. 
Prosecution Evidence and Witnesses 










Althea Groves: Police dispatcher who called for a Taser unit  
Summary of Testimony: Ms. Groves confirmed that she made the call for a unit with a Taser to 
assist at the intersection where Shawn Davis was walking with the knife. She also verified that 
everyone with a working police radio should have heard the call for a Taser unit.  
Joseph Collins: Officer who followed Shawn Davis on foot  
Summary of Testimony: The officer testified that he followed Shawn Davis on foot for blocks 
but he never felt his life was in danger. Officer Collins drew his gun after Shawn Davis displayed 
a knife but was careful to keep his distance from him. "We were trying to buy time to have a 
Taser. He didn't make any direct movement at me, and I felt like my partner was protected for 
the most part inside the vehicle," he said. "It was kind of like organized chaos. We were just 
trying to be patient." 
John Patrick: Police medical examiner 
Summary of Testimony: Dr. Patrick reviewed the coroner’s report and testified that Shawn 
Davis died as the result of multiple gunshot wounds. “Shawn Davis died as the result of 16 
distinct gunshot entry wounds to his scalp, neck, chest, arms, back, and his right leg.” 
Samuel Burns: Law enforcement educator 
Summary of Testimony: Mr. Burns reviewed a dashcam video. “Unfortunately, the dashcam 
video is very poor quality, but as you can see in the progression of these screenshots, Shawn 
Davis appeared to be walking away from police in an unthreatening manner in an area absent of 
other pedestrians or bystanders. It seems unreasonable for the officer to have fired one, let alone 
16, shots into this man. He should have tried to de-escalate the situation instead of firing his 
weapon.”    
Under cross-examination from the defense: Mr. Burns conceded that it was plausible 
for Shawn Davis to run into the nearby Burger King or Dunkin Donuts with his knife in 
hand. 
Defense Evidence and Witnesses 















Defense Witnesses:  
Dale Seabaugh: Mike Smith’s partner the night of shooting 
Summary of Testimony: The officer testified that he was concerned Shawn Davis would enter 
the nearby restaurants and injure people inside. “This guy had been stealing and terrorizing 
people with a knife. I mean, he had already punctured the tire on a police cruiser, so I was 
worried that he might go into the Burger King or Dunkin Donuts and hurt people in there.” 
Nathan Miller: Police psychologist and law enforcement educator  
Summary of testimony:  Dr. Miller testified that police recruits are explicitly taught that knives 
are deadly weapons that can pierce their bulletproof vests and that someone with a knife can 
close a distance of 21 feet in less than two seconds. Their police training at the academy always 
includes knives as dangerous, deadly weapons. "Officer Mike Smith responded to what he 
perceived was a deadly threat, responded in a way based on his training, in a way that was 
designated to neutralize that threat as he understood it."  
Mike Smith: Defendant on trial  
AUDIO: 






Summary of Testimony: Smith testified as he got out of the car that night, he saw Shawn Davis 
"extend out a knife, flicking it toward his side."  
"His face had no expression. His eyes were just bugging out of his head. He had these huge eyes 
just staring right through me. I was yelling at him drop the knife, I was yelling at him I don't 
know how many times. He got probably about 10 to 15 feet away from me.”  
"We never lost eye contact. He turned his torso towards me. ... It looked like he waved the knife 
from his lower right side, upwards across his body towards my left shoulder. Those pictures 
don’t show my perspective. I felt like he was coming toward me, threatening me with that knife. 
Everything was happening so quickly, and I had to make a decision to shoot him or get stabbed, 
so I shot him."  
CLOSING STATEMENTS 
PROSECUTION:  The defendant didn’t have to end Shawn Davis’ life that night, ladies and 
gentlemen. He could have hit him with the car door or tapped him with the front of his squad car. 
He could have checked on how soon the Taser would arrive. Yes, someone needed to arrest 
Shawn Davis for damaging a police cruiser and to question him about breaking into vehicles. But 
Mike Smith did not need to stop him with a hail of gunfire. That’s not self-defense. That’s not 
fear for personal safety, that is murder. 
DEFENSE: At any point throughout his wild rampage that night, Shawn Davis could have 
dropped the knife and he would be here today. It is unprecedented for a police officer to be 
charged with murder for doing his job. Officer Mike Smith had no motive, no malice, and no 
premeditation. You can use your common sense, ladies and gentlemen. You can determine what 
is a murder. This wasn’t murder, this was an officer doing his duty to protect himself, his fellow 






Instructions in both the superseding moment and totality of circumstance conditions will also 
contain the instructions from the control condition.   
CONTROL: 
DIRECTIONS: The following are the judge’s final instructions. Please read every word and 
pay close attention as these instructions are very complex. It is very important that you read 
through these very carefully and understand them before delivering a verdict. 
THE JUDGE’S INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU, THE JURY 
Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the facts from the evidence in this case and to 
apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. Faithful 
performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the administration of justice. The defendant, Mike 
Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.  
A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful 
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:  
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm; 
                                   OR 
2) knew that such acts would result in death; 
                                   OR 
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is 
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he is guilty.  
SUPERSEDING: 
Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the facts from the evidence in this case and to 
apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. Faithful 
performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the administration of justice. 
Police officers are lawfully justified in using deadly force under some circumstances. The 
reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With respect to a claim of 
excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.  
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 
The defendant, Mike Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.  
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A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful 
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:  
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm; 
                                   OR 
2) knew that such acts would result in death; 
                                   OR 
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is 
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he is guilty.  
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE: Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the 
facts from the evidence in this case and to apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor 
prejudice should influence you. Faithful performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the 
administration of justice. 
Police officers are lawfully justified in using deadly force under some circumstances. The 
reasonableness of a particular use of force depends on the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case. Factors you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was 
unreasonable include, without limitation:  
The need for the force used;  
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;  
The extent of the victim’s injury;  
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;  
The severity of the crime at issue;  
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;  
Whether warning was given; 
Whether the victim was actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if 
the victim was attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably 
appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person. 
The defendant, Mike Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.  
A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful 
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:  
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm; 
                                   OR 
2) knew that such acts would result in death; 
                                   OR 
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is 
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable 





As a jury member, would you find the defendant GUILTY or NOT GUILTY 
o Not Guilty 
o Guilty 
 
Please select the option that best expresses your opinion about whether the defendant 
should be found GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. 
o Definitely not guilty 
o Not guilty 
o Probably not guilty  
o Unsure 
o Probably guilty 
o Guilty 
o Definitely guilty 
 








THE IMPORTANCE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE 
Below, you will see brief summaries of information presented by prosecution and defense 
witnesses during the trial. For each, please indicate how important the testimony was in helping 
you reach your verdict decision. 











Officer Joseph Collins followed 
Shawn Davis on foot for blocks 
and did not feel his life was in 
danger. 
     
Every officer knew that a Taser 
unit was on the way. 
     
Shawn Davis was shot 16 times. 
 
     
The dashcam photos appeared 
to show Shawn Davis walking 
away from the officer. 
     
According to a law enforcement 
educator, Officer Mike Smith 
should have tried to de-escalate 
the situation.  
     
Shawn Davis had been stealing 
and threatening people with a 
knife. 
     
Shawn Davis had already 
damaged a police cruiser with a 
knife. 
     
Officer Mike Smith’s was 
trained that knives are deadly 
weapons that can pierce 
bulletproof vests and someone 
with a knife can close a distance 
of 21 feet in less than two 
seconds. 
     
Officer Dale Seabaugh feared 
that Shawn Davis would injure 
people in nearby restaurants. 
     
Officer Mike Smith believed he 
was being threatened with a 
deadly weapon. 





Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 








I tried to imagine how I 
would feel if I were in the 
officer’s place. 
 
     
I tried to imagine what I 
would think if I were in 
the officer’s place.  
     
I tried to imagine how 
things looked from the 
officer’s perspective. 
     
Items adapted from Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence 








MEMORY FOR CASE FACTS 
Please indicate whether each of the following statements are TRUE or FALSE according to the 
evidence that was presented.  
Officer Joseph Collins (a prosecution witness) testified that Shawn Davis did not make 
any direct movements toward him while he followed Davis on foot. 
T/F 
Sam Burns (a prosecution witness) testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking 
away when he was shot by Mike Smith.  
T/F 
Mike Smith (the defendant) testified that he repeatedly instructed Shawn Davis to “drop 
the knife and get down on the ground before I shoot.”  
T/F 
Shawn Davis popped a tire on a police cruiser with a knife. T/F 
Nathan Miller (a defense witness) testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking 
toward the officers. 
T/F 
The coroner’s report identified 13 entry wounds T/F 
Nathan Miller (a defense witness) testified that police recruits are taught that knives are 
deadly weapons 
T/F 
Althea Groves (a prosecution witness) testified that some of the police officers working 








Please answer the following questions about the jury instructions you were given before 
making your verdict decision.  
Did the instructions include the following statement?  
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With respect to a 
claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.  
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 




Did the instructions inform you that you could consider the following factors when making 
your verdict decision?  
The need for the force used;  
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;  
The extent of the victim’s injury;  
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;  
The severity of the crime at issue;  
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;  










CONCEPTUAL MANIPULATION CHECK 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  








The jury instructions encouraged 
me to rely on my own attitudes 
and beliefs to determine 
reasonableness. 
     
The jury instructions encouraged 
me to rely on an objective 
standard to determine 
reasonableness. 
     
The jury instructions guided me 
to focus on the very split-second 
when the officer used fatal force. 
     
The jury instructions guided me 
to focus on all of the facts and 
circumstances that occurred 
before and after the officer used 
fatal force.  








What do you think the study was about? There is no right or wrong answer, we just want to know 









Please indicate your age in years as a 2-digit number (e.g., 29). 
 
 




Please indicate your race/ethnicity – check all that apply: 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Asian 
o African American 
o Hispanic 
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
o White 
o Other 
What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed? 
o No high school degree 
o High school or GED 
o Some college 
o Bachelor’s degree 
o Graduate or professional degree 
When it comes to your stance on social issues, are you… 
o Extremely Liberal 
o Mostly Liberal 
o Slightly Liberal  
o Moderate 
o Slightly Conservative 
o Mostly Conservative 





***If “Moderate” is selected, participants will see the following: 
Do you lean towards liberal or conservative when it comes to social issues? 
o Lean toward Liberal  
o Neutral or Uncertain 
o Lean toward Conservative 
 











Have you interacted with a police officer(s) in the last 12 months? 
o Yes 
o No 
• If participants select ‘yes’ they will see: 
Please indicate how positive or negative you would rate your interaction(s): 
o Very negative 
o Negative 
o Neither negative nor positive 
o Positive 







Thank you for participating in this study.  We would like to explain more about its 
purpose.  It is probably obvious that we are interested in examining people’s perceptions about 
police-involved shootings. We are also interested in exploring how different types of jury 
instructions influence the outcomes in cases involving excessive use of force.  You may have 
read jury instructions that guided you to consider only the moments preceding the shooting, 
instructions guiding you to consider the totality of circumstance regarding the police use of 
force, both, or neither.   
We chose to manipulate the type of instructions you were given because social psychological 
research has demonstrated that the type of instructions provided to jurors affects verdict 
outcomes (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017).    
Additionally, only recently have police officers been charged with using excessive force and it is 
important to understand why jurors may or may not find the officer guilty.   
We want to remind you that all data and resulting analyses associated with this study were non-
identifiable, and were managed to protect your privacy.    
Finally, if you were emotionally upset by any of the contents of this study, we suggest that 
you seek professional guidance in processing the experience.   
Please contact us if you have any questions.  
Thank you for your participation in this study.  
Contact for further information: 
Chasity Ratliff, M.A. 
chasity.ratliff@siu.edu  
Liana Peter-Hagene, PhD 
claudia.peter-hagene@siu.edu 
 
Click NEXT to receive your confirmation code to be compensated.   
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.  
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the 
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Compliance, Southern Illinois University, 
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